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Eurocentric Territorialization K

#### The aff’s attempt to displace whiteness from property is driven by a ficticious sense of belonging that attempts to map out the world---the impact is violent reterritorialization

**Bifo 15** [Francesco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, *Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2015, p. 121-6]

Identity and Identification

In the 1980s Goldstein had been an activist of the Kach Party, an openly racist, anti-Arab right-wing organization founded in Israel by Rabbi Meir Kahane. Later, as a doctor, Goldstein gained notoriety in Israel because he refused to treat Arabs who needed medical attention. After receiving his assignment as a military doctor, he told his commanders that his religious faith did not allow him to treat wounded or ill Arabs, including those who served in the Israel Defense Forces. His superiors decided not to punish his refusal, but merely to reassign him to South Lebanon.

It would be as unfair to read Goldstein’s crime as an expression of the Orthodox Israeli culture. But we have to read madness in its context, and we can read the crime as a symptom of that malady that goes under the name of identity.

Identity is not naturally ascribed; it is a cultural product: it is the effect of the hypostatization (fixation and naturalization) of the cultural difference, of the psychological, social and linguistic particularity. Identity is continuity and confirmation of the place and of the role of a speaker in the cycle of communication. In order to be understood, one must play one’s role in the game, and this role is surreptitiously identified as a mark of belonging.

But identity is continually searching for its roots, and the place from whence the enunciation comes is often mistaken as one of natural origins: primeval and therefore undeniably true. The community, which is a place of communication (a place of exchange of signs conventionally charged of meaning), is mistaken as a natural place of belonging, and transformed into the primeval source of meaning. The temporary and transitional convention that gives meaning to signs is strengthened and transformed into the natural mark or motivated relation between sign and meaning.

Identity may be seen as the hardening of the inner map of orientation. Identity is the opposite of style, which is singularity and consciousness of the singularity, a map of orientation flexible and adaptable, retroactively changing. Style never has a normative feature, nor implies any kind of interdiction and punishment. Identity is a limitation (unconsciously realized) upon the possibility of comprehension and interaction. It is a useful limitation, of course, but it is dangerous to mistake it as a condition of authenticity and primeval belonging. It is the condition of mutual aggressiveness, of racism and violence, and fascism. Identity is based on a hypertrophic sense of the root, and it leads to the reclamation of belonging as criterion of truth and of selection.

Identity is the perceptual and conceptual device that gives us the possibility of knowledge, but sometimes we mistake this knowledge for a re-cognition. So we are led to believe that which we already know, that we possess a map thanks to our belonging. This can be useful sometimes, but it is dangerous to mistake our cultural map for the inner territory of belonging. Without a map, one gets lost, but getting lost is the beginning of the process of knowledge; it is the premise for creating any map.

In their book Change: Principles of Problem Formation and Resolution, the psychoanalysts Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch write that the repeated application of the same solution in drastically different conditions is a neurotic attitude which leads to pathological situations.

Observed within the context of the current global dynamic of deterritorialization–re-territorialization, such neuroticism emerges as a constitutive component of today’s world order. On the one hand, globalization and the acceleration of cultural and economic exchanges have increased the need for the flexible adaptation of conceptual and linguistic maps. Yet at the same time, paradoxically, the deterritorialization that globalization entails hugely intensifies the need for an identitarian shelter, the need for the confirmation of belonging. Here lies the identitarian trap which is leading the world towards the proliferation of points of identitarian aggressiveness: the return of concepts such as the homeland, religion and family as aggressive forms of reassurance and self-confirmation.

We can also read this dynamic in terms of technomutation and ethno-mutation. On the one hand, information technology has provoked the acceleration and intensification of semiotic exchanges, and on the other hand, the displacement of people and massive waves of economic and political migration have provoked an unprecedented change in the ethnic landscape of the territories, with all the concomitant cultural contamination and intermixing. In conditions of competition, these processes tend to excite the need for identitarian belonging, and to give way to identitarian aggressiveness.

According to Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, universal history can be viewed as a process of deterritorialization. Deterritorialization is the passage from a space whose code is known to a new space, where that code loses its meaning, so that things become unrecognizable for anyone attempting to use the code that was produced by the previous territory. The history of capitalism is continuously producing effects of deterritorialization.

At the outset, capitalism destroyed the old relation between the individual and both the agricultural territory and the family. Subsequently, it jeopardized the national borders and created a global space of exchange and communication. Currently, it is jeopardizing the very relation between money and production, and opening the way to a new form of immaterial semiotization. As capitalism destroys all forms of identification, it frees the individuals from the limitations of identity, but simultaneously it provokes a sense of displacement, a sort of opacity that is attributable to the loss of previous meanings and emotional roots. As a result, capitalism ultimately provokes a need for reterritorialization, and a continual return of the past in the shape of national identities, ethnic identities, sexual identities, and so on.

Modern history is a process of forgetting that provokes an effect of anguish and that forces people to desperately hold onto some kind of memory. But memory has faded, together with the dissolution of the past, such that people have to invent a new set of memories. Like the character Rachel in the 1982 neo-noir sci-fi film Blade Runner, people create their own memories, putting together pieces of old texts, of faded images, of words whose meaning is lost.

‘Memory is right’, said Chaim Weizmann, when summoned to the Congress of Versailles by the victors of the Second World War, in reference to the right of Jewish people to reclaim the land of their ancestors.2

Weizmann’s assertion, which was fundamental for the creation of the state of Israel, today sounds like an arrogant provocation. Memory is not right, but it is part of an identity, and identity is not based on memory; rather, identity creates memory.

Milan Kundera writes the following about the future and the past:

People are always shouting they want to create a better future. It’s not true. The future is an apathetic void of no interest to anyone. The past is full of life, eager to irritate us, provoke and insult us, tempt us to destroy or repaint it. The only reason people want to be masters of the future is to change the past. They are fighting for access to the laboratories where photographs are retouched and biographies and histories rewritten.3

Contrary to common belief, the past is far from unchangeable. The past only exists in our minds, and therefore it takes new shapes as we distance ourselves from it, and as we displace the viewpoint from which we are remembering.

‘Memory is right’ was not only a provocation, it was a declaration of war, as different memories conflict. The creation of Israel is based on Weizmann’s contention that memory is right, and the never-ending war between Israel and Palestinians is based on the arbitrary identification of memory and right.

#### Despite their opposition to hegemony, they buy into Eurocentric discursive practices the reify exceptionalism and prevent genuine resistance

**Spanos 2K** [William, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Binghamtom, *America’s Shadow*, 2000, p. 191-193]

What I have argued in this book about the relationship between philosophy and imperialism is that the euphoric annunciation of the end of history and the advent of the New World Order by the deputies of the dominant American culture at the end of the Cold War is symptomatic of the achievement of the global hegemony of "America" understood not simply as a political order, but as a way of thinking. I have claimed that this triumphant "American" way of thinking is not exceptionalist, as it has always been claimed by Americans, especially since de Tocqueville's announcement of the advent of democracy in America, but European, which means metaphysical: an imperial thinking, whose provenance resides in Roman antiquity, that sees the being into which it inquires as a totalized spatial image, a "field" or "region" or "domain" to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited.

But this way of putting this imperial metanarrative, though necessary in the context of the amnesiac imperatives of thinking the Enlightenment as an epochal emancipatory moment in world history, is too general.

It does not account for the historically specific transformation of this European mode of knowledge production accomplished in the wake of America's emergence as a global power: the fulfillment of the Enlightenment's "developmental model" in the effacement of the visible imperial logos informing traditional metaphysics by way of the apotheosis of the "objectivity" of empirical science and the advent of the classificatory table. Under the aegis of a triumphant America, the narrative economy of European metaphysics has come to its end in the form of a universal instrumentalism, a Man-centered thinking for which everything in time and space is seen as a "problem" that the larger comparative "picture" renders susceptible to a final and determinate solution.

In Heidegger's proleptic terms, European metaphysical thinking in the technological age dominated by America has become "Americanized," a "representational"/"calculative" thinking or "planning" that has transformed the uncalculability of being at large into a planetary "world picture":

"We get the picture" concerning something does not mean only that what is, is set before us, is represented to us, in general, but that what is stands before us — in all that belongs to it and all that stands together in it — as a system. "To get the picture" throbs with being acquainted with something, with being equipped and prepared for it. Where the world becomes picture, what is, in its entirely, is juxtaposed as that for which man is prepared and which, correspondingly, he therefore intends to bring before himself and have before himself, and consequently intends in a decisive sense to set in place before himself. Hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth. Wherever we have the world picture, an essential decision takes place regarding what is, in its entirety. The Being of whatever is, is sought and found in the representedness of the latter.1

Reconstellated into the context of this Heideggerian diagnosis of modernity, the American end-of-history discourse undergoes a resonant estrangement. What is euphorically represented as "good news" —the global fulfillment ("end") of the emancipatory promise of History — comes to be seen as the Pax Metaphysica: the colonization of the errant mind of humanity at large by a banal and banalizing thinking that has reduced everything, including human beings, to "standing [or disposable] reserve."2

This "end of philosophy" in the form of a "triumphant" instrumentalist thinking that has reduced being to disposable commodity is everywhere manifest in the post-Cold War era. And, I suggest, its most telling symptom is the globalization of (American) English as the lingua franca of the "free market," which has as one of its most devastating consequences the "Americanization" not simply of the Western nation-states but of entire Third World cultures.

What for the purpose of my argument this global triumph of "American" thinking means is that even those who would oppose American global hegemony are, insofar as they remain indifferent to the ontological grounds of its sociopolitical practices, condemned to think their opposition according to the imperatives of the discursive practices they would oppose. They thus fulfill the expectation of the deputies of American culture who predict that "even nondemocrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the single universal standard."3

That is to say, the fulfillment of the European metanarrative in the globalization of American technological thinking, that is, the Americanization of the planet, has tacitly reduced opposition to a resonant silence. It is in this sense that, with Heidegger, the intellectual who is attuned to the complicity between Western philosophy and imperialism is compelled to call this "age of the world picture" presided over by America a "destitute time" or, more suggestively, "a realm of in-between" — "the No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming."4

In the context of the impasse of oppositional thinking, in other words, he/she is compelled to acknowledge the time of the postCold War occasion as an interregnum. This, for an opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat. But for the oppositional thinker who is attuned to the ontological exile to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking — the "shadow" that haunts its light — that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, the primary task of the marginalized intellectual is the rethinking of thinking itself. And, as I have suggested, it is the event of the Vietnam War — and the dominant American culture's inordinate will to forget it — that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible.

#### The alternative is to theorize universality as central to struggle---that’s the only way to escape reactionary repetitions

McGowan 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Conclusion: Avoiding The Worst,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Conclusion, ebook, dml)

Universalist projects always threaten to become seduced by the possibility of creating the universal into a full presence rather than discovering it as a necessary absence. In doing so, they succumb to terror. This is the perversion that universalism must constantly be on guard against. Whenever people insist on their ability to create a world of complete equality, we should recognize this perversion at work. Even if the perversion of universality is an unavoidable danger inherent in universalizing, it is nonetheless worth the risk. The alternative of total particularity is more murderous and barbaric than the Committee for Public Safety. This is why the solution cannot be a retreat into the confines of particularity.

Particularity does not exist without the absent universal that gives this particularity its sense. The universal is antecedent to the particular. The attempt to retreat from the danger of the universal to the security of a particular identity is doomed to fail. What’s more, the repression of universality for the sake of a full embrace of particularity leads to disaster.

Although it doesn’t appear as evident, the danger of the extreme particularity that capitalism produces is even more ominous than the gulag. The dangers of particularity have the advantage, however, of being much more difficult to discern than those of universality. This is why no one talks about the number of people killed under capitalism. The visibility of the gulag for us today contrasts with the invisibility of exploited laborers, racist institutions, and underlying misogyny that sustain the capitalist system. Although we don’t readily see the horrors that capitalism’s unbridled particularity unleashes, we must nonetheless pay attention to them when tallying up corpses.

When we examine the horrors of capitalism’s insistence on particularity, the leger of destruction ceases to seem so one-sided. The suffering perpetuated in the name of universality actually pales in comparison with what occurred quietly under the banner of particularism. From children working in sweatshops to millions living in favelas to the reign of military warlords, particularism destroys lives without even holding out the promise of universal freedom and equality. It does so in order that a few individuals can pursue the project of accumulation without restraint.

The destruction that capitalist particularity has perpetuated includes two world wars, when the capitalist insistence on particularity led to national identitarian conflicts that make the Reign of Terror look like a time of peace and prosperity. The violence of particularism doesn’t appear as part of an explicit project in the way that universalism does, which is why we don’t chalk it up to particularism or identity as such. The structure of particular violence—a particular identity commits it—ends up exculpating particularism because we blame the individual identity rather than the political philosophy of particularism (or the capitalist structure that demands it). Our judgment on particular identities like that of the Nazis rather than identity as such enables identity to get off scot-free from the judgment of history. When it comes to universalism, the situation is reversed, the blood that universalism sheds redounds to the universal itself, not to the individual actors who order the violence.

When one attributes the violence of two world wars to the capitalist insistence on particularity, this immediately raises questions. The violence that particularism produces seems like natural violence rather than the result of any political project.2 No one entered into the wars in the name of particularity itself but rather for the sake of national interest. This is the case even for the aggressors. But when one enacts violence for the sake of an identity, one is not acting naturally, since there is nothing natural about identity. Every claim about the natural status of violence conceals the particularity (and identitarian philosophy) performing the violence. Such violence always exists against the background of a particularist system and a particularist politics.

Blindness to the violence of particularism makes it easy to impugn universality and to envision political struggle without it. But without the appeal to universality, politics becomes nothing other than a battle between competing interests. When this situation arises, the strongest interest, the interest of capital itself, inevitably wins. The retreat into identity neither spares us from violence nor gives us a more secure route to emancipation. It does nothing but create the possibility for conservative rule.

For too long, politics around the world has been staged on right-wing terrain. We envision a particular world with particular causes. This image of politics leads inevitably to right-wing victories, even when moderates win elections. One cannot count the election of Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, or Emmanuel Macron as a triumph for emancipation but as part of the contemporary conservative wave, despite the explicit political affiliation of these figures. In a world of competing particulars, there is no possibility for an emancipatory breakthrough.

But this is not the only possible way of envisioning political struggle. If we view political contestation as a struggle for the form that the universal will take, we are on the terrain of the Left and the project of emancipation. We don’t need to opt for the universal in one grand act but must begin to theorize universality as the fundamental stake in political contestation. The great leap forward consists in recognizing politics as the struggle between universality and particularity. Once we take this leap, we force the Right to play all their political games on the road. Unlike in football games, in a political struggle home field advantage always wins, and gaining this advantage depends on recognizing the role of universality in politics. The fight for emancipation must be a universal fight, or it cannot be won.

### 1NC---OFF

Bifo K

#### The 1AC creates the new standard for a productive worker, which empowers the spread of a thanato-political sentiment that results in global immiseration---vote neg to reject it

**Bifo 15** [Francesco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, *Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2015, p. 165-7]

Although I am persuaded that suicide is a problem of great importance for our times, my focus is not on the impressive increase in the number of people who commit or try to commit suicide, but on the particular significance that the act is coming to acquire at the social and cultural level.

An epidemic of unhappiness is spreading across the planet, while capital absolutism is asserting its right to unfettered control of our lives. As bio-semiocapitalism infiltrates the nervous cells of conscious sensible organisms, it inoculates in them a thanato-political rationale, a morbid sentiment which is progressively taking hold of the collective unconscious, culture and sensibility. The biopolitical effect of semiocapitalism (better said: the thanatological effect of semiocapitalism) is essentially the capture of cognitive activity, and the subjection of the faculty of expression of the linguistic animal to the sleepless, aggressive dynamics of the labour market.

Language is captured by the networked machine and turned into an essentially productive activity. Herein lies the trap: people are encouraged to consider their linguistic competence as factors of economic competition, and to manage and invest in them as such. Creativity, expressiveness, affection, emotion – the human soul, in other words – are considered to be productive factors, and consequently, they are evaluated according to standards of productivity. Exploitation, competition, precariousness, redundancy are not perceived as the effects of a conflictual social relationship, but are internalized as deficiencies of the self, as personal inadequacies. The unceasing restructuring of the organization of work is perceived as humiliation and brutality.

Only non-involvement and the ability to remain extraneous, to refuse any identification with one’s job and with one’s working condition, only a radical rejection of the ethics of responsibility, might offer workers the possibility of navigating a way out from this productivity blackmail.

Unfortunately, the ethics of responsibility, the phoney discourse on participation and collaboration, are prevailing in today’s political and cultural life. We invest our psychic energies and our expectations into work because our intellectual and affective life is poor, because we are depressed, anxious and insecure. So we are trapped. The industrial worker who was obliged to repeat the same gesture a thousand times every day had no reason to identify with her work – so she invested her psychological energies into solidarity with colleagues, and her mind was free to hate the assembly line, and to entertain thoughts that had nothing to do with her daily slavery. Conversely, cognitive workers have been lured into the trap of creativity: their expectations are submitted to the productivity blackmail because they are obliged to identify their soul (the linguistic and emotional core of their activity) with their work. Social conflicts and dissatisfaction are perceived as psychological failures whose effect is the destruction of self-esteem.

The French psychoanalyst Cristophe Dejours has written widely about this trap. In La Souffrance au travail he approaches a phenomenon which has been almost completely neglected by sociologists and psychologists alike: that of suicide in the workplace. He observes that, in the past, work and suicide had little in common. Industrial workers did suffer the separation between their productive activity and their mental life, but this suffering forced them to look beyond daytime work and to invest their psychic energy in solidarity. For cognitive workers, particularly in conditions of precariousness, solidarity is rare. Everyone feels alone, pushed to compete, at the mercy of precariousness.

#### That value system is directly responsible for a hypercompetitive climate that results in mass inequality, immiseration and internalization of failure

Monbiot 16 [George Monbiot is the author of the bestselling books The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order and Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain, as well as the investigative travel books Poisoned Arrows, Amazon Watershed and No Man's Land. His latest book is Feral: Searching for Enchantment on the ­Frontiers of Rewilding (being published in paperback as Feral: Rewilding the Land, Sea and Human Life), Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all our problems, Guardian, 4-1-2016, Accessible Online at https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot] 7-13-2016

Imagine if the people of the Soviet Union had never heard of communism. The ideology that dominates our lives has, for most of us, no name. Mention it in conversation and you’ll be rewarded with a shrug. Even if your listeners have heard the term before, they will struggle to define it. Neoliberalism: do you know what it is? Its anonymity is both a symptom and cause of its power. It has played a major role in a remarkable variety of crises: the financial meltdown of 2007‑8, the offshoring of wealth and power, of which the Panama Papers offer us merely a glimpse, the slow collapse of public health and education, resurgent child poverty, the epidemic of loneliness, the collapse of ecosystems, the rise of Donald Trump. But we respond to these crises as if they emerge in isolation, apparently unaware that they have all been either catalysed or exacerbated by the same coherent philosophy; a philosophy that has – or had – a name. What greater power can there be than to operate namelessly? Inequality is recast as virtuous. The market ensures that everyone gets what they deserve. So pervasive has neoliberalism become that we seldom even recognise it as an ideology. We appear to accept the proposition that this utopian, millenarian faith describes a neutral force; a kind of biological law, like Darwin’s theory of evolution. But the philosophy arose as a conscious attempt to reshape human life and shift the locus of power. Neoliberalism sees competition as the defining characteristic of human relations. It redefines citizens as consumers, whose democratic choices are best exercised by buying and selling, a process that rewards merit and punishes inefficiency. It maintains that “the market” delivers benefits that could never be achieved by planning. Attempts to limit competition are treated as inimical to liberty. Tax and regulation should be minimised, public services should be privatised. The organisation of labour and collective bargaining by trade unions are portrayed as market distortions that impede the formation of a natural hierarchy of winners and losers. Inequality is recast as virtuous: a reward for utility and a generator of wealth, which trickles down to enrich everyone. Efforts to create a more equal society are both counterproductive and morally corrosive. The market ensures that everyone gets what they deserve. We internalise and reproduce its creeds. The rich persuade themselves that they acquired their wealth through merit, ignoring the advantages – such as education, inheritance and class – that may have helped to secure it. The poor begin to blame themselves for their failures, even when they can do little to change their circumstances. Never mind structural unemployment: if you don’t have a job it’s because you are unenterprising. Never mind the impossible costs of housing: if your credit card is maxed out, you’re feckless and improvident. Never mind that your children no longer have a school playing field: if they get fat, it’s your fault. In a world governed by competition, those who fall behind become defined and self-defined as losers. Neoliberalism has brought out the worst in us Among the results, as Paul Verhaeghe documents in his book What About Me? are epidemics of self-harm, eating disorders, depression, loneliness, performance anxiety and social phobia. Perhaps it’s unsurprising that Britain, in which neoliberal ideology has been most rigorously applied, is the loneliness capital of Europe. We are all neoliberals now.

### 1NC---OFF

Economization K

#### Neoliberalism is a discursive politics that relies on the work of the market metaphor. The AFF’s articulation of the social world in economic language re-constitutes all life as market, cementing the neoliberal dream and leading to the economization of life.

P.W. Zuidhof 12, Associate Professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism,* 2012, Pages 4-11.

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### Their description of revolution in minor key as a “prohibition on anti-competitive business practices” is reason alone to reject the 1AC. They assume human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms, securing capitalism’s hegemony.

Kip Austin Hinton 15, Assistant Professor, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color,” Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(2), 299-319, 2015.

Influence of an Economic Metaphor on Communities of Color

It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor.

Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu’s (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu’s original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu’s initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism.

Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Kovecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), ¨ “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem’s definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.

In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.

Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capitalrelated social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”

Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges.

Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician’s description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study’s content works against oppression, language choices may not.

Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher pushout rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native ´ American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldua’s (1990) call for a more empowering ´ theory. Yet I think of Lorde’s (1984) warning, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master’s relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist’s tools, the capitalist’s relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.

I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.

#### The economization of life has given rise to the Econocene---an unsustainable period of ecological collapse sustained by economism as the dominant secular religion. The Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

Richard B. Norgaard 19, Professor Emeritus of Ecological Economics in the Energy and Resources Group at the University of California, Berkeley, “Economism and the Econocene: a coevolutionary Interpretation,” real-world economics review, issue no. 87, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue87/Norgaard87.pdf

The uniformity across geographies of fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies and the economies of scale of fossil hydrocarbon technologies selected for the corporate industrial order we know today. These direct changes, along with the coevolutionary processes of selection, freed people from coevolving with the complexities of the natural environment. This in turn gave rise to modern economism that pays no heed to nature. With our cosmos being the modern industrial order, economism emerged as the dominant secular religion, an eclectic package of beliefs that explain our place in the economic system, our relation to other people and nature, and how we should live what has been deemed a meaningful life.

Belief in markets spread, indeed was carried around the world, even forcefully so, to counter the rise of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, through efforts to “free” trade globally, and through the implementation of the idea of development. By the second half of the 20th century, much of the world was beginning to look like the market world assumed in economic models. In the late 20th century, the globalization of capital began and the interconnections between the patches of Figure 3 began to look more like Figure 6.

People performing specialized tasks are now so interdependent through markets that if people do not believe in markets and their larger purpose, all markets would collapse, as financial markets nearly have periodically, most recently in 2008. If markets collapse most of our population of 7.7 billion people would very quickly starve. Economism is necessary to sustain the economic cosmos in which people live.

Economism, however, has also become the dominant form of reasoning and the source of metaphors and utopias used in public communication. With the shrinkage of other ways of thinking about systems, economistic terminology has even become critical to how conservation biologists explain nature to the public. Nature, like other forms of wealth, can be thought of as capital that pays dividends in the form of ecosystem services. Saving nature has become a process of designing economic incentives for individual actors to invest in nature in order to reap her ecosystem services. In turn, conservation biologists now frame their research around market terminology to back up the ecosystem market programs they have helped facilitate. Biology is becoming economism.

The industrial order sustained by economism is not sustainable itself. We are in the Econocene maintained and coevolving with economism. Any new social organizational system that is sustainable, socially just, and provides meaningful lives will also need its “ism” to keep it going. This raises a key question. How can we have new system of beliefs/values, ways of thinking, and social organization emerge, a new ism, without crashing the current economic system, with economism maintaining it, on which we depend during the transition?

During the 20th century economistic beliefs have supported diverse and coevolving capitalisms as we know them and resulted in spectacular changes. Human population roughly quadrupled from about 1.6 billion people to 6.3 billion people. Global market economic activity during this period increased by nearly a factor of 40, or about 10-fold per capita. This rise of market activity entailed a parallel rise in specialization in work and associated knowledge. We went from a 19th century world in which the vast majority of people on the globe were pretty closely tied to the land and performing a similar mix of comparable agricultural and domestic activities to a 21st century world in which most people are performing specialized tasks using task specific knowledge. People are tied to bureaucratic structures, both public and private, while being globally interconnected by markets.8 This new system has proved extremely effective at producing material goods while also presenting unprecedented social and environmental challenges. It is this transformation into what I will call the Econocene that must be understood in order to find our way out.

While social organization, knowledge, and values were coevolving around fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies, however, the geosphere and biosphere systems were operating on a different time scale, accumulating the CO2 and other greenhouse gases that are now resulting in climate change, sea level rise, and a further quickening of the extinction of species.

The Econocene is a period of rapid transition of the geosphere and collapse of the biosphere. The transition to sustainability, social justice, and meaningful lives will not occur simply through the use of market mechanism to reduce carbon in the atmosphere. The economy has become our cosmos. We awake to stock market reports from financial capitals several time zones to our East, work in command and control hierarchical corporate structures while praising free markets, and are absolutely dependent on others in distant places working for the global economic machine. City lights and polluted air curtain us from the starry heavens, few are even aware of the phase of the moon. Reality is on the screens at our desks and on our cell phones in our hands, we share hearts through social media rather than in person. To face the reality we are in, our consciousness needs to become much more closely aligned with how nature and people function in a rapidly changing interaction. The economism that drives and coevolves with the Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

#### The alternative is to become critically aware of the generative force of metaphor. We can accept the 1AC, but must reject their marketized language.

Michael Augustín 15, postgraduate student of PhD. program at Department of Political Sciences of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, “The Market Metaphor As an Issue of Political Language and Practice,” Czech Journal of Political Science, March 2015.

2. Defining Approach

A metaphor is a figure of speech that is often employed in political theory and political practice. It is not peculiar to politics as a social science, though: metaphors may guide our understanding of complex, difficult relationships in any domain. But they may also mislead. Because of this, examining their impact takes on urgency, and this is what we do in the text that follows. The Czech political scientist Petr Drulák speaks of metaphor in politics in terms of discursive structures, i.e., customary rules that impact the discourse itself (Drulák 2009: 59). Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By suggest that metaphor is more than simply a speech act or poetic ornament. Rather than being a purely linguistic phenomenon, it pertains directly to our thoughts and actions: how we think and behave is largely influenced by metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3–4). An example they cite, ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’ is a perfect example, and confirms that the way we perceive a particular activity impacts how we perform it.

The use of metaphor is thus in no way neutral. Metaphor has a determining influence over our understanding of particular situations. It frames the subject and decides how we think about a topic area. Individual metaphors organize our thoughts and actions and become a substitute for thought and analysis, but often gain uncritical acceptance and harbour certain perils (Patterson 1998: 221). They function to suppress certain aspects of a situation and emphasize others, thus shaping meaning in a way that justifies particular actions or sanctions particular acts, or simply aids in choosing goals (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 142).

Terrell Carver and Jernej Pikalo confirm that metaphors such as ‘branches of government’ and ‘head of state’ used in describing political situations and processes influence our political perceptions (Carver, Pikalo 2008: 1). Jonathan Charteris-Black develops the argument that in political contexts, metaphor is used for ideological purposes because it activates unconscious emotional associations; metaphors change how we understand and think about politics by influencing our feelings (Charteris-Black 2011: 32) and thereby contribute to myth creation (Charteris-Black 2011: 28). Metaphor is typically used in persuasion and frequently employed in the language of rhetoric and argumentation, such as in political speeches (Charteris-Black 2004: 7). But its use does not end there. It has proven an impressive tool for academic research. But it may happen that the researcher becomes so entranced by the clarity and simplicity of argumentation that metaphor offers that he or she overlooks deeper connections in the phenomenon under study.

Before we examine the central issue in this study, we must first differentiate between the concepts of analogy and metaphor as used in this paper. By ‘analogy’ we shall intend a perceived similarity between two entities. The ‘metaphor’ is a higher-level mapping of these similarities that is used to communicate them in the form of a figure of speech. In the current context, the logic is as follows: if in political discourse we speak of politics as a market, we have created a metaphor based on the similarity of properties. If instead we observe that politics involves a competition for voters just as the market mechanism embodies a competition for customers, or that catallactic (i.e. exchange) patterns obtain in politics as they do in the economic market, we have spelled out a concrete similarity and in so doing have pointed out an analogy. Thus, we are analyzing specific similarities between the marketplace and the political system, which we may term analogies, that are subsumed under the market metaphor.

The metaphor may be imagined simply as a set and the analogies it implies as a subset of that metaphor. In a typical deduction, the premises taken together may be said to form a set. Syllogistic reasoning is applied using this set of two or more propositions asserted or assumed to be true to arrive at a conclusion. We may consider an analogy to be a premise (‘politics is an exchange’, ‘politics is a competition’). The metaphor is then the argument, and is more complex (‘politics functions as an economic market’). Metaphors always implicitly contain a set of analogies that state some A is like B. A set of such analogies therefore creates the metaphor A is B. We know of no other scholar who works with metaphor and analogy in this particular formulation, but we consider the distinction between analogy and metaphor to be justified.

The approach to metaphor and analogy presented here is complementary to that given in Donald Schön’s Generative Metaphor: a Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy. The operation of the economic metaphor in politics shares common ground with Schön’s generative metaphors. His topic is social policy, and he notes that social policy has more to do with how we frame the objective to be achieved than it does with the selection of the optimal means to achieve it (Schön 1993: 138). ‘Such a multiplicity of conflicting stories about the situation makes it dramatically apparent that we are dealing not with ‘reality’, but with various ways of making sense of reality’ (Schön 1993: 149). Inadequate metaphors inevitably give rise to insidiously inadequate solutions, because some are based on an inappropriate or simplistic understanding of the situation.

Generative metaphor is generative in the sense that it generates new perceptions and explanations, and invents reality. So not all metaphors are generative (Schön 1993: 142). But the market metaphor in politics does generate new perceptions and provide new insight into the political process. It is obvious that Schön is aware of the inherent risk that generative metaphors bear, and he calls for critical analysis to uncover their non-analogical connections: ‘The notion of generative metaphor then becomes an interpretive tool for the critical analysis of social policy. My point here is not that we ought to think metaphorically about social policy problems, but that we ought to become critically aware of these generative metaphors, to increase the rigor and precision of our analysis of social policy problems by examining the analogies and ‘disanalogies’ between the familiar descriptions’ (Schön 1993: 138–139)

## ON

### 1NC---AT: General Strike

#### General strikes are utopian, empirically impotent, and get cracked down on.

Nowak and Gallas, 14—PhD in political science AND Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Kassel (Jörg and Alexander, “Mass Strikes Against Austerity in Western Europe – A Strategic Assessment,” Global Labour Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, dml)

The frequency of general strikes during the crisis years surpasses anything seen post-1980: the number of general strikes in the EU-15 plus Norway was 18 between 1980 and 1989, 26 from 1990 to 1999 and 27 between 2000 and 2009 (Hamann et al., 2013). In contrast, there were 38 general strikes in the period between 2010 and May 2014 (own count). The focus of this strike wave is in the five countries with the highest incidence of general strikes since 1980, which are all severely affected by the Eurozone crisis: 19 of these 38 strikes were in Greece, six in Italy, five in Portugal, four in Spain and three in France. In Belgium, there was one general strike in January 2012, the first one since 1984 (ibid.).

But this increase in the incidence of general strikes is no reason for optimism on the side of labour: The context of the wave of general strikes is a long-term decline of the relevance of economic strikes in the same countries. While the average number of strike days per year had been 16.6 per 10,000 employees in 1980-2 for the EU-15 plus Norway, it fell continuously to 1.1 in 2004-6 (Hamann et al., 2013). The strike activity also fell if we consider the share of workers (out of 1,000) on strike: In Western Europe, it plunged from 97 in the 1970s to 67 in the 1980s and 29 in the 1990s (Scheuer, 2006: 148f). In the 2000s, the number went down again, this time to 21 (European Commission, 2011: 46; Vandaele, 2011: 29). In other words, unions were increasingly unable to organise sectoral strikes, which can be explained with the restructuring of work and labour relations in the neoliberal era and its results: the overall decline of industries with a strong union presence; a secular decline of union density; and the fact that many trade unions focussed their strategies on (industrial) core workers, whose numbers also decreased (Vandaele, 2011: 32f.).

The upsurge of general strikes is a consequence of the fact national governments increasingly adopted neoliberal and austerity agendas: welfare state retrenchment moved the terrain of struggle to the political level. Governments curtailed social rights and workers rights, as well as cutting public expenditure. This development gained traction in the course of the global financial and economic crisis when governments started to impose draconian austerity agendas in an authoritarian fashion. This suggests that the increasing popularity of political strikes and general strikes is due to the fact that governments on the whole refused to negotiate with unions when they adopted the politics of austerity.

While the participation in general and political strikes since 2008 was spectacular, they were on the whole unsuccessful. There is not a single case of a government offering substantial concessions after one of the general strikes since 2008. Similarly, there were minor concessions only in one case, the general strike in Belgium in January 2012. This in stark contrast to the period before 2008: Between 1980 and 2011, there were government concessions in 27 of 68 cases (40 per cent; substantial: 8, minor: 19) and no concessions in 41 of 68 cases (60 per cent) (Hamann et al., 2013). Post-2008, one and two day general strikes (and even the fighting strike in France in 2010) were ineffective regarding material concessions. In other words, the class relations of forces in the crisis were unfavourable to labour.

The Limits of Quantitative Analyses

Interpretations of the strike wave since 2008 diverge considerably. Stefan Schmalz and Nico Weinmann argue that there is a trend towards more irregular conflicts and more incoherence between countries compared with the wave of mass strikes from 1968 to 1973 (Schmalz and Weinmann, 2013). Kurt Vandaele contends that there is an increasing convergence between European countries, both in terms of the long term decline of economic strikes (Vandaele, 2011) and the growing significance of political mass strikes (Vandaele, 2013). Gregor Gall also sees a trend towards convergence, which consists in the growing significance of political mass strikes and the emergence of the public sector as the centre of trade union activities (Gall, 2012).

Both Vandaele and Gall highlight that there are limits to quantitative analyses as they have been conducted in the past 30 years, thus questioning to some extent their own approaches. Vandaele implies that if strike action takes place in the public sector, it is not primarily at decreasing profits, but at disrupting everyday life through the suspension of public services. In this context, the number of days not worked, or of workers participating, are not the best indicators for the strength of a stoppage because it is possible to block a service with a small number of workers (Vandaele, 2011: 33). It follows that analyses of labour activism should take on board qualitative factors in order to grasp the full picture. Gall highlights other aspects when he discusses the limits of quantitative approaches: Many political strikes in the public sector and many general strikes are not counted in the official statistics – despite the fact that they have been a dominant form of industrial action in Europe at least since the 2000s (Gall, 2012: 14f). For Gall the decrease of strike activity is exaggerated if one operates on the grounds of these numbers.

The limits of quantitative approaches are visible in Schmalz and Weinmann’s analysis, which draws its political conclusions almost entirely from an evaluation of quantitative data about ‘nonnormative conflicts’. They state that trade unions exercise less control over mobilizations than they did between 1968 and 1973 (Schmalz and Weinmann, 2013). It disappears from the picture that many of the big trade union-led stoppages in the 1970s drew their momentum from wildcat strikes (Birke, 2007: 218f, 274f.; Gallas and Nowak, 2013), which is not the case for the current European strike wave, where union federations predominantly instigate the action.1 Hamann et al. (2013) also work with a quantitative approach, trying to detect patterns that explain under which circumstances general strikes yield successful results. Since the current strike wave is marked by the general absence of concessions, this methodology is difficult to apply. In contrast, Gall’s analysis considers the political context of the European strike wave, explaining its novelty by highlighting that unions are either excluded ‘from the process of political exchange’ (Gall, 2012: 2) or that political negotiations increasingly yield poor results for workers. Following him, there has been an erosion of corporatism, which means that the political strike became the primary means of struggle in France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. According to Gall, this form of strike has strength to it because it entails big political mobilizations as ‘expression of collective discontent against and contestation of neoliberal policies’ (Gall, 2012: 20).

A Luxemburgian Typology

In this section, we propose a qualitative account of mass strikes inspired by Rosa Luxemburg. With regard to the recent wave of mass strikes, we can show what type of industrial action we are examining, and where its strategic limits lie. For this purpose, we develop a typology of strikes based on a qualitative description with four axes.

LUXEMBURG’S UNDERSTANDING OF MASS STRIKES

While scholars tend to reflect on the political context of political mass strikes and its strategic implications, they tend to neglect two aspects: The strikes are defensive strikes, and they are, to a large extent, without success, -- despite the unprecedented size of the mobilizations. Before we elaborate on these aspects, we will discuss the concept of the ‘mass strike’, which is used by Gall and Vandaele without providing a proper definition. We believe that Rosa Luxemburg’s work provides some insightful observations on mass strikes, which can be used to determine the concept. These can be found in her text The Mass Strike, the Political Parties and the Trade Unions, written in 1906, after the strike wave that led up to the (failed) Russian revolution in 1905. Obviously, there is no revolutionary situation in contemporary Europe (quite the contrary), but we believe that we can gain some general insights from Luxemburg by isolating her observations from their historical context.

She does not confine the concept of ‘mass strike’ to political strikes and highlights that purely economic strikes sometimes very quickly get a political dimension. One of her examples is a stoppage in the railway repair workshops in Kiev in July 1903. The strike movement grew after the police arrested two delegates of the railway workers. The subsequent blockade of the local railway station led to a police massacre with more than 30 dead workers. On the next day, a general strike started in all parts of Kiev. Inspired by these events, there was a general strike in Jekaterinoslaw in early August 1903 (Luxemburg, 1906/2008: 125). The famous strike in Petersburg in January 1905 exhibits a similar dynamic: Two workers were dismissed because of their membership in a legal official workers’ association. About one week later, 200,000 workers attended a march to the castle of the Tsar in order to submit a petition. A bloodbath followed, leaving between 200 and 1,000 workers dead. This in turn paved the way for a wave of mass strikes that lasted until the summer of that year, which led to the introduction of the 8-hour day in many sectors of the Russian economy (12 to 14 hours were the standard before the events) and to wage increases of around 15 per cent all over the country (Luxemburg, 1906/2008: 127f).

But Luxemburg underlines differences as well: While the strikes in 1903 started as sectoral, economic strikes and became political conflicts in their final phase, the mass strikes in 1905 reversed the pattern: they started with a unified political programme and led to many partial and independently organized economic strikes all over Russia. This distinction is not just of historical importance, but pertains to a central feature of Luxemburg’s understanding of mass strikes: The mass strike does not exhibit a unified pattern and cannot be identified ahead of its unfolding in a concrete struggle: ‘Its adaptability, its efficiency, the factors of its origin are constantly changing’ (Luxemburg, 1906/2008: 140). It is only possible ex post to chart mass strikes in a given conjuncture. But there are some defining features, which we can extract from Luxemburg’s account of the events in Russia: First of all, they disrupt political life, affect public discourse and provoke massive responses from governments or other state bodies (Luxemburg, 1906/2008: 140f). A second central aspect is the mobilizing character of mass strikes for the working class: Workers experience the power that goes along with collective action, gain experience in political struggles and see the need for organization. Importantly, these are qualitative features: the mass strike is not defined on the grounds of simple numbers (be they absolute numbers of participants or working days lost or relative numbers compared to the size of the population), but in terms of its effects, both on the political scene and the working class. In this sense, the 1984-5 Miners’ Strike in Britain can be seen as a mass strike (even though it was confined to one industry); in contrast, the public sector strikes in Germany in 1992 and 2006 involving hundreds of thousands of workers are not necessarily mass strikes, because they did not have persistent effects on the political scene and their mobilizing character for the German working class was limited.

Importantly and contrary to some readings of her work, Luxemburg does not glorify the mass strike. She underlines that there are limits to its effectiveness in the Russian context: While the first general strike in January 1905 led to a national wave of economic strikes, and a second national strike in October ended with political concessions of the Tsar, the third general strike in December resulted in defeat: An armed uprising of workers in response to state repression against the strike in Moscow was crushed by the military, and efforts by the social democrats to organize a fourth national strike in 1906 were not successful (Luxemburg, 1906/2008: 139f.). Luxemburg concludes the chapter with the following words: ‘The role of the political mass strike alone is exhausted, but, at the same time, the transition of the mass strike into a general popular rising is not yet accomplished. (…) The stage remains empty for the time being.’ (Luxemburg, 1906/2008: 140). This suggests that calls for mass strikes are only useful in specific conjunctures, and that other forms of political and social action prevail in other periods.

FOUR ANALYTICAL DISTINCTIONS

Against this backdrop, we propose a typology of the mass strike inspired by Luxemburg’s analysis (cf. Gallas and Nowak, 2012: 25f.). We use four distinctions to describe the different types of the mass strike. These distinctions are inspired by Luxemburg, who operated in a similar way without providing a systematic conceptual elaboration. They are analytical in character. Of course, the reality of a particular strike is always messy and sometimes produces grey zones that complicate or even defy categorization. But it is impossible to understand the causes, dynamics and effects of strikes without the use of analytical distinctions.

1. The first distinction concerns the aims of strikes. It runs between economic strikes that relate predominantly to the workplace, and political strikes that address extra-economic issues. Economic strikes address issues such as wages, layoffs and working conditions. One example for a political strike is the fight for universal suffrage: the labour movements in Belgium, Britain and Germany in the 19th and early 20th century demanded the vote not just through demonstrations, but also by going on strike. Luxemburg emphasizes that political and economic strikes constantly blend into each other (Luxemburg, 1906/2008: 144).

2. The second distinction relates to the extension of strikes: there are ‘partial’ strikes that affect just one sector of the economy (sectoral strikes) or one particular region or city (local or regional strikes), and general strikes that cut across sectors and are held at the national level (for Luxemburg’s use of the term ‘partial’, see 1906/2008: 142).

3. The third distinction is about the direction of a strike movement: Offensive strikes aim to reach a goal set by the strikers themselves (that is, wage increases or the recognition of independent unions by the state and employers), while defensive strikes try to block measures proposed by the government or employers (that is, layoffs or cutbacks of pensions) or are intended to defend rights such as universal suffrage or freedom of the press (Luxemburg, 1906/2008: 119).

4. The fourth distinctions reflects the form of strike: Demonstrative strikes voice the opinion of workers and are limited to one or two days, while fighting strikes are about striking until the goal of the stoppage or a compromise has been reached, or until the workers decide to give in (Luxemburg, 1906/2008: 143).

The vast majority of the mass strikes in Western Europe since 2008, on the grounds of our typology, are political strikes because they are directed against plans of the government to restrict rights and cut social expenditure. Furthermore, they are defensive and general strikes. Finally, they are usually demonstrative strikes limited to one or two days.2 In a nutshell, the type of strike dominating the Western European wave of mass strikes is the political, general, defensive and demonstrative strike.

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PATTERNS

Vandaele stresses that there are regional patterns of strike activity, and he is grouping European countries into five categories according to their different industrial relations regimes (Vandaele, 2011). For a group of ‘Southern’ European countries – France, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal – he describes a common pattern characterized by ‘long-lasting employer hostility towards union recognition’ (Vandaele, 2011: 16) and a weak institutionalization of collective bargaining. Similarly, Gall argues that the political mass strike became the main strike method in the same countries since the late 1990s, reflecting the fact that the ties between social democratic parties and the union movement have not been very close in these countries, given the huge weight of communist trade unions (Gall, 2012: 20ff).

What is noteworthy is that the countries in question are also those where the vast majority of political strikes against austerity happened after 2008. So one could see this as a case of path dependency rather than a new political dynamic. But there is still a much higher frequency of these strikes since 2009. This suggests that two factors come together: First, the countries already had an established tradition of the political strike, which emerged in the late 1990s; and, second, the countries are worst hit by the Eurozone crisis (with the exception of France). Besides, there is a genuinely new development in that the strike wave reaches countries that do not belong to this first group: there were political strikes against austerity in the UK (which, according to Vandaele, belong to a Western European group) and in Belgium (which belongs to a Western-central European group). In the UK, the strikes have so far been confined to the public sector, but there are debates among the unions about the possibility of a genuine general strike (Gallas and Nowak, 2012: 70ff) – something that has not taken place in the country since 1926.

Political Strikes Against Austerity as a Reflection of the Conjuncture

The type of strike that is prevailing in the Eurozone Crisis, the defensive political strike, is both a reflection of a specific political conjuncture and of class relations of forces unfavourable to labour. Two aspects of this situation are important for debates on strategies: the fact that the strikes have been unsuccessful to a large extent and the fact that they are facing ‘physical limits’ in the form of violent state repression.

Against this backdrop, it appears that many of the big trade unions in the countries that are affected heavily by the crisis are halfway stuck between organizing protests against austerity and attempts to keep channels of negotiations open. This is changing slowly in some of the countries, for example in Britain, Spain and in Portugal, where unions are beginning to take a more confrontational stance vis-à-vis governments. To illustrate the two aspects, we will take a closer look at the strike against the pension cuts in France in October 2010, given that they were most advanced form of protest against austerity: it went against the dominant pattern insofar as the strike was not a demonstrative strike limited to one or two days; in fact, it lasted for about three weeks.

THE FRENCH STRIKE AGAINST PENSION CUTS

In spring 2010, the French government announced pension cuts. As a reaction, a three-week general strike against pension cuts erupted in October 2010, the main issue being the increase of the retirement age from 60 to 62. Similar mobilizations in 1995 and 2006 had brought substantial concessions (Lindvall, 2011). The strongholds of the 2010 strike were the refineries.

The strike was unsuccessful despite the fact that there was a broad consensus among the main trade unions behind the strike and public opinion was in favour: According to opinion polls, 60 to 70 percent of the population supported it. Furthermore, participation in demonstrations was high – much higher than in 1968 and comparable to 1995 (1968: 500,000; in 2010, 2.5-3 millions on various occasions). However, in 2010, the number of workers on strike was comparably low: estimates run between 500,000 and 1,000,000. In 1968, nine million workers were on strike, and in 1995, it was considerably more than one million workers. (During the 2006 protest movement, there were no mass strikes) (Gallas and Nowak, 2012: 56ff; USS, 2010).

In 2010, participation rates among important groups like railway workers and students were low because these groups had just been defeated in drawn-out conflicts that had taken place only a few months before the strike. The main bases of the strike were the oil refineries, the ports, and the public sector in the region of Marseille. Outside these main bases, the strikers were very much dispersed across sectors and workplaces, so that demonstrations became the focal points of the mobilization. Obviously, these demonstrations did not have much of an impact on the economy or the public infrastructure. The strikes in the refineries, which led to a shortage of fuel, had not been organized properly by the unions. As soon as the police and military arrived at the scene, the strikers gave up blockading (Gallas and Nowak, 2012: 59ff).

Arguments between the main unions (CFDT - Confédération française démocratique du travail and CGT - Confédération générale du travail) resulted in a moderate strategy: When the fuel shortages led to problems in the productive sector, the main unions distanced themselves from blockading refineries and fuel stores. The main unions were not prepared to start a proper confrontation with the Sarkozy government, because they believed that the Socialist Party (PS) was not ready for a change of government: The PS was divided on the issue of pensions and quarreled about the party leadership. Sarkozy’s strategy to refrain from offering negotiations or concessions surprised the unions. It was a new pattern of class politics in France.

The conditions of struggle throughout Europe had changed considerably with the onset of the financial crisis, but the main unions in France used the same old political strategies (Gallas and Nowak, 2012: 59ff): they wanted to change public opinion. Furthermore, they banked on the PS gaining the presidency in 2012 and repealing the restructuring of the pensions system. Hollande was carried to office by the strike movement but did not deliver on the demands of the strikers that he had included in his agenda. His attempt to restore the status quo ante in the area of pensions was half-hearted: the return to a lower pension age (60) will only affect 110,000 people. The focus of the unions on a change of government turned out to be a strategic mistake.

DEADLOCK

The French example reveals the deadlock that trade unions in many European countries face in the crisis. The old strategies of working with threats and blockades as well as hoping for negotiations and changes of government do not appear to work any longer. The political strikes against austerity conform mostly to what Beverly Silver (2003: 20) calls ‘Polanyi-type of labor unrest’: they are struggles predominantly based in sectors where layoffs, privatisations and restrictions of workers’ rights pose a threat to the existing labour force. This constellation of struggle produces specific challenges and dilemmas for labour, which mean that winning is difficult: If public sector workers, who were crucial for most of the mobilisations in Europe, go on strike, the state saves money. The strikers can make up for this by interrupting the economic and social infrastructure, for example by blockading public transport and roads, but this is difficult to sustain and creates tensions with the infrastructure users. Furthermore, if workers are indeed blockading key sites of the infrastructure or of production, there is a real danger that the repressive state apparatuses break strikes with force: this happened when air traffic controllers struck in Spain in 2010, and also in France in 2010 at the refineries.

Surely, the political strikes against austerity had a mobilizing character. But the fact that unions in the crisis countries on the whole did not gain any concessions – neither through negotiations nor through attempts to exert ‘influence from without’ (Gall, 2012) – reveals that the working classes in these countries generally lacked any sort of political leverage, which goes further than just saying that we are witnessing the ‘end of social democracy as a credible political force’ (ibid.). And in those cases where workers were able to mount effective resistance and put pressure on governments, repressive state apparatuses intervened on their behalf. How is it possible to overcome this impasse? There are three possible ways: (1) blockades are so widespread and massive that there are not enough repressive forces available to effectively break them; (2) political pressure is strong enough that the government withdraws from violent intervention; or (3) labour activists develop new tactics that deal with violence in one way or another. The first option of an all-out blockade seems utopian, and it is difficult to build effective political pressure. But the labour movements across Europe cannot evade the question of how to build up effective pressure when faced with governments unprepared to make concessions, but ready to break strikes with violent means. If organized labour is not able to address this question, ‘the stage will remain empty’ for the time being.

Strategic Lessons

Unions are faced with a dilemma in the European crisis. They find themselves in a situation of weakness where it would be better to lay low and gain strength first, but they are not controlling the conditions under which they operate. They are under attack and cannot afford to lose because this would have devastating consequences: unemployment and impoverishment for the working people in the crisis countries and a seriously constrained room for manoeuvre for labour. In this situation, they tend to resort to staging symbolic political strikes, which thus become the terrain for the reconstitution for working class movements across Europe. The strikes are supposed to represent shows of strength, but their results in terms of concessions are meagre. In other words, governments across the Eurozone have called the bluff of the trade unions by choosing not to move in response to the strikes.

In this situation, unions have to rethink their strategies. But it is not enough to simply call for a radicalization of trade unionism. There are reasons why unions resort to the rather moderate means of the symbolic political strike. Thanks to the crisis, their members are faced with the serious economic hardship caused by wage cuts. Furthermore, they are under the threat of being laid off, and finding a new job is very difficult under conditions of a deep economic crisis. The ‘silent compulsion of economic relations’ (Marx, 1867: 899) is further amplified through cuts in the welfare system, which make it even harder to cope with unemployment. Finally, it is difficult to call for a radicalization when people have already been defeated at various occasions, which has a demoralizing effect. In this situation, simplistic calls for militant action have a ring of radical posturing. As a result, the starting point of any debate on union strategy should be on the existing pattern of struggle, and how its elements can be recomposed to lead to a more forceful result.

### 1NC---AT: Resilience

#### Their Hartman evidence misconstrues survival with resilience---that spectacle empowers hegemonic institutions, disempowers victims of structural oppression, and turns psychological health

James 14 - (Robin James is Associate Professor of Philosophy at UNC Charlotte, ON RESILIENCE & ‘SELF-CARE AS WARFARE’, September 28, 2014, <http://www.its-her-factory.com/2014/09/on-resilience-self-care-as-warfare/)//TR>

I’ve been using the concept of [resilience](http://www.its-her-factory.com/2014/05/oh-bondage-up-yours-resilience-as-feminine-ideal-and-racializing-technology-my-philosophia-2014-talk/) as a way to understand one of these latter methods. (I think self-care is legible as resilience only when subjects occupy specific situations.) What do I mean by ‘resilience’? Well, some women are tasked with the imperative “you must be a survivor.” We’re supposed to Lean In, or show “grit” by learning to code, to rock, to run, or whatever. By overcoming our personal gendered damage, we both (a) show that society has overcome patriarchy, and (b) take out the trash, those individuals/groups who aren’t flexible, adaptable, indeed, resilient enough to keep up with the post-feminist times. Resilience is a means of producing (a) and (b)–it’s a way of organizing society to funnel the profits from this surplus value to privileged people and institutions. This is why resilience is not about personal healing: resilient self-care is just another, upgraded way of instrumentalizing the same people.

Resilience is not actually about your survival; it’s about the survival and health of hegemonic institutions like MRWaSP. It’s a strategy MRWaSP uses to wage its war. Contemporary white supremacist patriarchy “includes” some formerly excluded populations, but they’re included as always in need of remediation, as eternally working on and improving themselves (we’re not “in” yet, just constantly leaning that way). (Just to be clear: individuals can be seen as successfully and finally remediated, but the group as a whole still isn’t completely finished.) This is really convenient for capitalism too, because people’s endless laboring on themselves opens up the personal “disciplines” (what were formerly preconditions for capitalist production, what standardized workers and made them docile cogs in the machine) as sources of surplus value production.

The labor of resilience only seems like self-care because society is structured so that it functions optimally when you (or people like you) succeed. So resilience isn’t about cultivating what you need, it’s about adapting to dominant notions of success. What they say is ‘healthy’ might not actually be healthy, for example. This is self work, but not necessarily self “care.” This sort of work looks and feels like care because its rewards are generally affective, physiological, and personal. It is a kind of “care” labor on the self, but it is not actually “caring” in the sense of 70s feminist care ethics, i.e., of cultivating relationships that support one another. In fact, I think cultivating relationships that support one another–that is, re-organizing society on whatever scale you can to make it more survivable–is one of the best ways to think about refusing the work of resilience. It’s quite similar to what Ahmed describes as “redirecting care away from its proper objects.”

Re-organizing relationships of support and dependence is one thing that happens when workers go on strike. In a well-organized strike, supporters and participants help one another do things that would normally happen as a business transaction, like the provision of food and services. So maybe those of us tasked with the work of resilience should imagine our resistance not as warfare, but as a strike. There’s a difference between surviving a system predicated on your death, and bending the circuits of systems designed to support (a very narrowly drawn model of) your life. In the former case, your survival disrupts systems predicated on your death; in the latter case, refusing to work/generate surplus value diminishes the vitality of the systems that profit from your work.

I think there are some other important differences between resilience and guerilla self-care, differences that make it pretty clear that “an individual woman who is trying to survive an experience of rape by focusing on her own wellbeing and safety” is not “participating in the same politics as a woman who is concerned with getting up ‘the ladder’” (Ahmed). First, resilience is a specific method for producing human capital, that is, for getting a return on the investments you make in your self-improvement. And to get these returns, your recovery must be spectacular–that is, made into a spectacle consumable (and shareable) by others. Resilience discourse makes a spectacle of the performance of survival. Self-care isn’t resilient self-work unless it’s rendered into human capital, i.e., what gets you “up the ladder.” Second, self-care is an ongoing process. Dealing with trauma can be a lifelong project. Resilience, on the other hand, treats therapeutic overcoming as a resolved accomplishment: I was once damaged, but now I am better. Resilience says “Look, I Overcame” (spectacle + past tense).

### 1NC---AT: Whiteness

#### The 1ACs emphasis on disrupting whiteness creates investments in the perpetuation of racial violence.

Mbembe 15. Achille Mbembe, “Achille Mbembe on The State of South African Political Life,” Africa As A Country, September 19, 2015, http://africasacountry.com/2015/09/achille-mbembe-on-the-state-of-south-african-politics/

The old politics of waiting is therefore gradually replaced by a new politics of impatience and, if necessary, of disruption. Brashness, disruption and a new anti-decorum ethos are meant to bring down the pretence of normality and the logics of normalization in this most “abnormal” society.  Steve Biko, Frantz Fanon and a plethora of black feminist, queer, postcolonial, decolonial and critical race theorists are being reloaded in the service of a new form of militancy less accommodationist and more trenchant both in form and content.

The age of impatience is an age when a lot is said – all sorts of things we had hardly heard about during the last twenty years; some ugly, outrageous, toxic things, including calls for murder, atrocious things that speak to everything except to the project of freedom, in this age of fantasy and hysteria, when the gap between psychic realities and actual material realities has never been so wide, and the digital world only serves as an amplifier of every single moment, event and accident.

The age of urgency is also an age when new wounded bodies erupt and undertake to actually occupy spaces they used to simply haunt. They are now piling up, swearing and cursing, speaking with excrements, asking to be heard.

They speak in allegories and analogies – the “colony”, the “plantation”, the “house Negro”, the “field Negro”, blurring all boundaries, embracing confusion, mixing times and spaces, at the risk of anachronism.

They are claiming all kinds of rights – the right to violence; the right to disrupt and jam that which is parading as normal; the right to insult, intimidate and bully those who do not agree with them; the right to be angry, enraged; the right to go to war in the hope of recovering what was lost through conquest; the right to hate, to wreak vengeance, to smash something, it doesn’t matter what, as long as it looks “white”.

All these new “rights” are supposed to achieve one thing we are told the 1994 “peaceful settlement” did not achieve – decolonization and retributive justice, the only way to restore a  modicum of dignity to victims of the injuries of yesterday and today.

Demythologizing whiteness

And yet, some hard questions must be asked.

Why are we invested in turning whiteness, pain and suffering into such erotogenic objects?

Could it be that the concentration of our libido on whiteness, pain and suffering is after all typical of the narcissistic investments so privileged by this neoliberal age?

To frame the issues in these terms does not mean embracing a position of moral relativism. How could it be? After all, in relation to our history, too many lives were destroyed in the name of whiteness. Furthermore, the structural repetition of past sufferings in the present is beyond any reasonable doubt.  Whiteness as a necrophiliac power structure and a primary shaper of a global system of unequal redistribution of life chances will not die a natural death.

But to properly engineer its death – and thus the end of the nightmare it has been for a large portion of the humanity – we urgently need to demythologize it.

If we fail to properly demythologize whiteness, whiteness – as the machine in which a huge portion of the humanity has become entangled in spite of itself – will end up claiming us.

As a result of whiteness having claimed us; as a result of having let ourselves be possessed by it in the manner of an evil spirit, we will inflict upon ourselves injuries of which whiteness, at its most ferocious, would scarcely have been capable.

Indeed for whiteness to properly operate as the destructive force it is in the material sphere, it needs to capture its victim’s imagination and turn it into a poison well of hatred.

For victims of white racism to hold on to the things that truly matter, they must incessantly fight against the kind of hatred which never fails to destroy, in the first instance, the man or woman who hates while leaving the structure of whiteness itself intact.

As a poisonous fiction that passes for a fact, whiteness seeks to institutionalize itself as an event by any means necessary. This it does by colonizing the entire realms of desire and of the imagination.

To demythologize whiteness, it will not be enough to force “bad whites” into silence or into confessing guilt and/or complicity. This is too cheap.

To puncture and deflate the fictions of whiteness will require an entirely different regime of desire, new approaches in the constitution of material, aesthetic and symbolic capital, another discourse on value, on what matters and why.

#### Coercive mimeticism leads to color-checking and a new standard of “recognizable ethnicity”---turns case

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Part of what I am talking about here is what the Lacanian Latino Studies scholar Antonio Viego (2007) refers to as “coercive mimeticism,” an institutional and social practice whereby there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act, believe, dress, and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-enough, as Black-enough, as Asian-enough, and so forth. It is mimetic insofar as one has to look into the mirror of ethnic identity and adapt oneself to that image, reproducing a very particular ego-identity, one that is often a poor fit to one’s more immediate subjective experience. It is also coercive in that there are institutional, cultural, and societal pressures to conform to that notion of identity in order to find one’s place in the coordinates of race and ethnicity – essentially, to be allotted a place on the color line. We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. Here we can glean both the imaginary and symbolic functions of racial object maps. These object maps provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. At the same time, racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me, Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate closeness, distance, and racial desire. Conversely, what is contained, or to be more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-producing, formless nature of the color line. When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to see their image in the mirror, when they are unable to play the language games of race and racial signification, there is a noticeable discomfort and anxiety that sets in among those who partake in the production of coercive mimeticism. The illusion of the color line comes into focus, disrupting how we see and define racialized bodies, evoking the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of the child’s body prior to Lacan’s (2005a, b) mirror stage. The illusion of wholeness, of being a whole body-ego – whether White, Black, or Brown – falters, revealing the destitute, undifferentiated, and broken nature of race and racial identity. To survive the encounter with the Real of race, I argue, paves the way for a unique kind of freedom. To give one example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression. This fluidity at the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities. To be clear, I am not denying the importance of addressing colorism, racism, and the privileging of white skin that exists in the Latino community and other ethnic minorities (not to mention society as a whole). It is important for us to have that conversation, and point out how notions of mestizaje, of hybridity in the Latino experience, may mask underlying tensions around race and skin color, and render the relative privilege of light-skinned Latinos such as myself invisible. At the same time, I am proposing that we also have a conversation that is perpendicular to a critique of racism and colorism, intersecting with it but going towards a different vector. How we exclude one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it means to be Latino, Asian, Black, etc., threatens to disempower us further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a minority” as opposed to sustaining often difficult conversations about our sameness and difference. Similarly, as Baratunde Thurston (2011) points out in his recent book, How to be Black, often this kind of black-checking or color-checking narrows our vision of what it means to be Black (or Latino, or Asian, etc.). Reflecting on his own sense of his Blackness, he writes, “One of the most consistent themes in my own experience… is this notion of discovering your own Blackness by embracing the new, the different, the uncommon, and, simply, yourself” (p. 218). Color-checking prevents us from experimenting with different forms of dis-identification which enrich, challenge, and nourish us, and which hold the promise of new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt. As I argue, these perpendicular conversations push and pull toward different trajectories, but have as their intersection the most crucial nexus of political, cultural, and social justice. So what am I, in the end? I am whatever you want me to be: oppressor, oppressed, cracker, spic, enemy, friend, White, Black, lover, fighter, masculine, effeminate, strong, weak, dead or alive. Just know that with each turn, each attempt to define me, to mark me, to confine and bind me, you free me. Like the hysteric who produces ever shifting configurations of symptoms in order to throw the obsessive physician off guard (see Gherovici, 2003), I will keep producing knowledge of something else, something other, something that is incalculable and undefinable. Something Real. For you I’ll become a Hispanic hysteric, screeching Foucault (1972) with each symptom, with each episode of acting out, “Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (p. 17). Because in the end this is not really about me, or where I stand on the color line. It is about your illusion about where you stand and where you place yourself in the coordinates of race and ethnicity, of self and other, of Black and White. In that sense I function as your blank screen, receiving your projections and identifications, hopefully returning them to you as knowledge productions that question, destabilize, and decenter your ego, paving the way for the subject that slides in the link between signifier and signified, that does not know if it is caused by the signifier or the signified of race, but is instead, its own cause.

### 1NC---AT: Hartman

#### Hartman’s understanding of legal representation is overly negative and eludes sources of potential liberation.

Doyle, 12—PhD candidate, Northeastern University (Benjamin, “Practicing “Politics [from] Without [the] Proper Locus”: Strategic Intimacies and the Subject of Unfreedom in Frederick Douglass’ “Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself” (1845),” <https://benjaminjdoyle.wordpress.com/tag/saidiya-hartman/>, dml)

Scholars of the Slave Narrative have gained significant ground in locating and theorizing on the socially transformative potentialities of black (and white) resistance to the sustaining modes of racial Othering determining who will and will not be afforded recognition as a rights-bearing subject within both nineteenth-century culture and our current normative racial political climate. While there has been broad scholarly investment in identifying the subversive strategies and tactics employed by both enslaved and “free” black subjects, in and outside the genres of direct narration, to unsettle the exploitative and exclusionary political modes of White domination, such scholarly critical assessments have tended to measure the efficacy of these acts of political resistance through their associative distance from the spatial and ideological locus of the dominant culture’s ways of being and practice. In other words, the effort has been to seek out, and, therefore, define, what counts as a transformative counter-culture or counter-normative discourse as necessarily located and enacted from without rather than within the spaces of domination. This approach, however, has caused many scholars to struggle to conceive of the space of un-freedom (of enslavement or post-slavery subjugation) as anything other than a negative political zone. This paper takes a different approach in determining the politicity of the enslaved subject and the socially and ideologically transformative potentiality his/her position of unfreedom makes possible. That is, this paper asks what it would mean to propose a transfiguration of the “proper” (i.e., normative) locus of political practice. That is, how might a critical reimagining of the “proper” grounding of the practice of politics as necessarily within rather than without the space of unfreedom contribute to the ongoing critique of the historical development of the normative political frame, and the continued hegemony of its self-authorizing “language of persons, rights, and liberties” (Hartman 6)? That is, might we learn something about (from) black counter-cultural forms of political resistance in the nineteenth-century by reconceptualizing the “proper” scene of the political through a reconsideration of how acts of political self-making and “partaking” (Rancière) emerge primarily within rather than from without the space of un-freedom? If we were to reconceptualize the very meaning of freedom as always already the subject of freedom’s lack – i.e., if we were to reassert the position of the enslaved subject as the proper locus of political practice – what might we learn about transformational political thought, relation, and action? What if alterity, and the political subject’s very distance from rather than its recognition and authorization of rights by the normative politics proper, defined the political ideal? Might the vulnerable deliberative actions of enslaved subjects – who even under the seemingly unalterable conditions of strategic surveillance (“hyper visibility”) and torture, compose “networks of affiliation” and strategized counter-modes of micropolitical resistance and revolt (Hartman) – demonstrate a more effective, ethical transformational politics that would allow for the emergence of more productive forms of rights making?

In Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman explores in shocking detail the daily “terror” of white on black racial violence enacted on the plantation is figured as much within the “shocking spectacle” of physical, bodily mutilation – rape, whippings, starvation, labor – as within “those scenes in which terror [could] hardly be discerned––slaves dancing in the quarters, the outrageous darky antics of the minstrel stage, the constitution of humanity in slave law, and the fashioning of the self-possessed individual” (4). Hartman’s careful treatment of a wide range of nineteenth-century slave narratives reveals as well, however, that the “clandestine forms of resistance” by enslaved blacks “were central features of everyday practice” (50). Though Hartman’s assessment of the internal modes of black resistance acknowledges the “possibility” of their “subterranean political practices,” she concludes such acts were by and large ineffective given the violent opposition enslaved subjects faced. A critical point of Hartman’s analysis shaping her negative political interpretation of the transformative potential of black resistance within such “scenes of subjection” is her extended explanation of how black subjection occurred both inside and outside the site of enslavement. The actual rather than “promised” conditions of “freedom” facing emancipated blacks, as Hartman shows, is characterized by “the loophole of retreat––a space of freedom that is at the same time a space of captivity” (9). In other words, the minority few enslaved persons who were capable of acquiring freedom from bondage, either through emancipation or “stealing away,” encountered not liberty but yet another form of subjugation in the North. As Hartman argues was the case, as much during the period of slavery as in the post-emancipation stages of national reconstruction, legal and political emancipation merely “replac[ed] the whip with the compulsory contract and the collar with a guilty conscience” (6). Given the fact of sustaining forms of unfreedom, Hartman makes tellingly clear that scholars must “reconsider the meaning of freedom” itself, for as she argues, “[T]he encumbrances of emancipation and the fettered condition of the freed individual . . . cast doubt on the narrative of progress” founding nineteenth-century liberal democracy and determining the prevailing imagined reality and empty rhetoric of today’s American exceptionalism (10).

If liberation from the bodily enslavement does not necessarily lead to the institutional recognition of rights and humanity of blacks, then locating freedom, either in the North or the South, is a tricky matter. In his 1845 Narrative, Frederick Douglass underscores what Christina Sharpe has similarly characterized as the “incomplete movement from slavery to freedom” (4) when he speaks to the false promise of the Northward trajectory of freedom. Upon arriving in New York, Douglass relates he remained “a fugitive slave in a strange land,” in constant danger of being recaptured by the “legalized kidnappers” – the “merciless men-hunters” of the North (69-70). Unable to receive work due to the overt racism against blacks by white laborers, Douglas enacts a powerful argument that the North was a “wilderness” of “wild beasts” and he could trust neither white nor black with recognizing his freedom obtained. Whereas Hartman is concerned with the ways in which blacks remained unfree even outside the space of direct enslavement, Douglass, too, is concerned with the continued subjugation of those who remain in bondage in the South. According to both Douglass and Hartman’s accounts, literal freedom cannot be fully obtained because whites in the North as much as those in the South refuse to acknowledge the inhumanity of black subjugation, then a shift in consciousness regarding the very idea of freedom – and perhaps more importantly, who precisely has and has not the right to make claims for freedom – must occur. For Douglass, however, unlike Hartman, the ambiguousness of the spatial and conceptual locus of freedom holds strategic potential for enacting the rights of the enslaved subject. That is, Douglass calls upon his audience to recognize this ambiguity of freedom and, therefore, reconceptualize the very ideas of freedom and unfreedom by adopting a critical form of consciousness that repositions the enslaved as the political subject who bears the rights to freedom and, therefore, is the political ground for establishing the proper locus for the practice of a socially transformative politics that, necessarily, must be negotiated from within the space of unfreedom.

For Hartman, however, she explains she remains skeptical of the efficacy of such calls for the “subterranean ‘politics’ of the enslaved” because, as she argues, their politics and rights-making procedures lack a “proper locus” (50). “[T]he possibilities of [these forms of] practice” as being “a ‘kind of politics’ . . . outside the ‘political proper,’” Hartman objects, “leads me both to question the appropriateness of the political to this realm of practice and to reimagine the political in this context” (64). While I do not disagree with the spirit of Hartman’s characterization of the slave-subject’s ostensibly negative political status, I would argue the letter of her argument problematically grounds what it means exactly to say the enslaved lacks a “proper locus” for his/her political “practice.” Hartman rightly asserts that nineteenth-century black subjects, free and enslaved, were violently situated “formally outside the [‘proper’] space of politics.” As she explains, “Slaves are not consensual and willful actors, the state is not a vehicle for advancing their claims, they are not citizens, and their status as persons is contested” (65). It is true enslaved persons not only lacked recognition as political agents, as subjects who could make “legitimate” claims to institutions of state power for legal representation or civic inclusion, but their very natural right-to-life (i.e., to be recognized as human) were rendered unintelligible by the politics “proper” as normatively situated. It is for that reason, however, that I take issue with Hartman’s leading claim, “Slaves are not consensual and willful actors,” for to suggest that one’s political subjectivity is defined by a consensus is to mischaracterize what politics is at its very core. If this statement is to mean they did not consensually agree to their position of political alterity, then, yes, of course. Yet, to say they are not “willful actors” resisting the biopolitical strategies to strip the slave-subject of all sociopolitical agency and institutionally recognized rights – the unmaking of a political subject – is to oversimplify the motivating conditions of such acts of resistance to a politics of “bare life.” A political actor is not “willful” in his/her subjection, but if s/he recognizes the only recourse to freedom from subjection is to refuse to accept his/her externally determined status of un-freedom, s/he must do so willingly.

It is important to carefully attend to Hartman’s own political aims motivating her statement that “slaves are not consensual,” that is, she is positing with purpose that their condition as enslaved-subject makes clear the movement toward political action does not position the enslaved subject as the primary causal agent of his/her action (s/he is not willfully a slave) or in the determination of his/her particular “needs or desires,” as the claims-making emerging from within the space of enslavement can only reflect “needs and desires” as defined by the very fact of enslavement. However, it should be made clear that no political act is done willfully, at least not in the sense that it could occur outside the space of subjection and domination. If there is no external force bearing down on the politically Othered body, there is no need for him/her/them to contest the denial of rights through enacting them – i.e., there is no need for politics as there is no desire for external forms of self-recognition denied by the politics proper. No one agrees to subjection – if one does, it is not subjection. And if one’s political right to dissent is not recognized by a “proper” locus, his/her grounding for democratic claims-making against subjection are always-already authorized, as Lloyd Pratt has cogently stated, by this “lack” (48), even if the authorizing position taken is unable, as of yet, to transform the abstract rights into immediate legitimate action or more transformative ethical forms of social-subject relations outside the space of enslavement.

Jacques Rancière makes a compelling argument for how to locate the proper site of politics under these conditions of a sustained unsettling of the “sensible” world. “The essence of politics is dissensus,” Rancière contends, “It is the demonstration (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself. Political demonstration makes visible that which had no reason to be seen; it places one world in another” (Dissensus 38). Following Rancière, Jason Frank argues in “Staging Dissensus: Frederick Douglass and ‘We the People,” most contemporary efforts to theorize the conditions under which the political subject emerges often begin with an “understanding of the people…as a unified subject,” whose “popular sovereignty” in democratic political processes is authorized by the “institutions that legally organize them” (210). Challenging this model, Frank looks to Rancière’s examination of the aesthetics of political practice to contend that such scholars who continually refer to the apparent primary position of external institution recognition in the determination of the political subject fail to address the ways in which the constitution of the subject as political body or being need not rely on institutional determinations nor the internalization of external institutionalized norms to authorize its “democratic claims-making.” Accordingly, Frank posits, the formation of a unified “we” often represents a “false unity.” Upsetting the normative constitution of the political subject within a politics proper is critical, therefore, for both Frank and Pratt in their treatments of Douglass’ politics. They rightly argue that to claim the space of consensus as the primary site of the formation of political subjectivity is problematic, for a postulated “we” indicates a self-sustaining ethos of solidarity that marks a moment of apolitical stasis rather than what Pratt maintains as the necessary “lack” of political recognition of the subject that determines the need that fuels the desire for the political subject’s emergence and his/her decisive action. In other words, what need is there for a political subject in a state of consensus, a scene without struggle, a world defined by stability and cohesion, where the integrity of the whole, and the norms that determine its shape, go unquestioned? Rather than consensus, following Rancière, Frank maintains across his reading of Frederick Douglass’ “constituent moment” in his “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July” address, political subjectification is “enacted” through a “staging of dissensus,” whereby the presence of “‘the part that has no part in the name of the whole’” is the source and subject of political activity, and it marks the emergence of the political agent who participates in a “struggle” of rights and recognition. Thus, Frank argues, this presence of “division” and “unsettlement” is what constitutes “the primary condition of the exercise of politics” – what begins with a fracturing of the collective ethos, leads to a contestation of rights, of responsibilities, of actions, and a need for an operation of political critique that opens up the possibility “for a new political subject’s emergence” (210-211).

In an effort to theorize the nature of transformative – i.e., nonnormative – political subjectification and practice as necessarily always already outside the “proper” field of politics, as this paper aims to do, I point to Pratt who rightly argues that if we understand “democracy’s warrant is a state of lack,” then, as he rightly asserts, “[A]lterity [can be] the only legitimate basis for political life” (48). Moreover, I would add there will always be a locus for enacting one’s right to political action, as there is never only one proper locus from which to ground one’s rights making, but there is always the normative proper and the non-normative proper locus of politics – and from whence you position your political practice will determine the transformational impact your sense of what is vs. what ought to be will have in the (re)ordering of the normative ways of being and practice. I believe this is an important point to acknowledge. It is critical to sustain an interrogation of the diverse ways in which people have historically been, and continue to be, refused recognition within the scene of “proper” (i.e., normative) politics, as Hartman rightly calls on her readership to do. However, to also continually challenge the very real ways in which acts of subversion occurring at the micropolitical level can unsettle the most seemingly intransigent macropolitical structures – i.e., to upset the sensible locus of a politics proper – especially those being enacted from within the space of unfreedom and without the authorization or recognition by the politics proper (i.e., normative), is to, however unwillingly, merely reify the perceived immutability of the dominating culture. In what follows I want to argue that “reimagining” the proper locus of politics from within the space of unfreedom is not only “possible” but if we look to the political strategy informing Douglass’ transformation politics – his poetics of dissensus – he makes a clear argument across his narrative autobiographies and public oratory that this transfiguration of the politics proper is critically necessary in the transformation of the order of society and culture.

But what exactly constitutes the reconfiguring of the proper locus of politics? On the one hand, it would seem that external recognition and authorization of the political subject’s rights is necessary. But who exactly counts in authorizing and recognizing these rights remains a bit more ambiguous. The recognition of rights, as Hartman sees it, must eventually occur from within the proper locus of the dominant culture’s political practice if the emancipation of blacks from enslavement and liberty from racial biopolitics is to ever be achieved. But if the denial of rights is occurring within the politics proper, how does the transformation occur internally? I would argue that a challenge to the racial politics structuring the collective ethos of the politics proper must happen from without the normative proper, an external process of reorganizing the proper site of political action as necessarily located within the space of unfreedom.

If politics is not itself the sign of freedom, nor should we fool ourselves into believing it as such, but is necessarily freedom’s lack – i.e., politics is the practice of unfreedom – then a politics is always a politics of the not yet, a sustained negotiation or critique of what “freedom” is vs. what it ought to be. As this paper will argue, the site of un-freedom – of bodily enslavement, legal subjugation, social alienation, fettered consciousness – where the very idea of freedom is put to task, constitutes the primary site of political action. The recognition of enslaved persons’ rights-making were de-authorized from without, as Hartman’s reading of the slaves’ ostensibly negative political status makes clear. However, it is against this racialized, white privileged, biopolitical strategy sustaining the denial of political participation, representation, and recognition of blacks inside and outside the space of enslavement that Frederick Douglass’ 1845 Narrative and 1855 “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July” address seek to transform, as this paper will argue, not by the assimilation of blacks into the “politics proper” that many scholars of Douglass problematically assert was the aim of his constitutionalism (Frank; Kohn), but by the reformation of the very means through which a “proper” (i.e., non-normative) politics ought to be enacted. To say this another way, it is not that Douglass desires solely a “politics of fulfillment” through the recognition of blacks’ right to political participation outside the space of enslavement (Gilroy), nor especially as merely a part within the given sociopolitical frame of White culture; rather, as I will demonstrate below, what Douglass makes clear in both his Narrative and his “Fourth of July” address is a call for a “politics of transfiguration,” the necessary prior stage of “making good” on the promise of freedom that demands recognition of the politicity of black political action within the very space of subjection and denial – the claims being made by enslaved blacks, as Douglass asserts, are the only proper claims that can be made regarding the conditions of injustice they face and of the redress they demand. Moreover, by positing a dual critique of liberalism’s fictions of freedom – where Douglass contends in both his Narrative and “Fourth of July” address that whites as well as blacks will remain, in fact, unfree as long as universal human freedom is being denied – Douglass repositions the “proper” site of political action as emerging from within the space of subjection and enslavement. That is, the very idea of freedom emerges within the scene of unfreedom and from within the critical consciousness of the unfree.

### 1NC---AT: Ballot

#### No correlation between ballots and general strike

**Cooper 17** [Marc Cooper, American journalist, author, journalism professor and blogger, Feb 12, 2017, “General Strike Generally Stupid,” https://www.laprogressive.com/general-strike/]

In all of American history I do not believe there has ever been one national general strike. In the early 20th century there were a handful of successful LOCAL general strikes… I’m thinking of Seattle in 1919 when somewhere around 65,000 workers went out for five days. There were also some statewide longshoremen strikes in the days of Harry Bridges.

Strikes, generally speaking, require that little detail known as UNIONS. The percentage of American workers currently unionized in the private sector is at an all time low of 6 percent. Unionized government workers are somewhere around 32 percent if you count cops and firefighters (unlikely strikers).

A general strike in the U.S. would mean the country is on the precipice of regime change and revolution. We are not. Further, we live in a country that, among Western democracies, provides the least amount of worker protection. Suggesting that non union workers strike for a day is irresponsible as nobody is prepared toto support them when fired. Most unionized workers labor under contracts that have a “no strike” clause in them anyway.

Any successful strike, even in ONE targeted industry or shop takes months and months of very very hard organizing. There is no preparation or organizing nor infrastructure to make this February 17 action anything more than science fiction.

It also suggests a recurring flaw in thinking among America’s “progressive” community. It is what Prof. Adolph Reed derides as the “spark theory”—that some EVENT like the occupation of the Wisconsin capitol 6 years ago or this coming “strike” is going to magically and overnight trigger a real social movement for change. Nope.

Social movements have to be built, painstakingly, by activists, organizers, leaders and rank and file. Engaging people in fizzled events like this ill-conceived nationals strike only demoralizes participants who sense the failure.

### 1NC---AT: Mutual Aids

#### Mutual aid is a form of neoliberal charity – it tells us to ignore the fact that the government is actively killing people through its formation and structural changes are necessary

Parenti & Emanuele 15 [Christian Parenti, former visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics, as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow, teaches in the Liberal Studies program at New York University, interview with Vincent Emanuele, writer, activist and radio journalist who lives and works in the Rust Belt, “Climate Change, Militarism, Neoliberalism and the State,” May 17, 2015, http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=1980]

You mention mutual aid and how it was overhyped by the left in the aftermath of Katrina. I’m thinking of the same thing in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. You’ve been critical of the left in the US for not approaching and using the state apparatus when dealing with climate change and other ecological issues. Can you talk about your critique of the US left and why you think the state can, and should, be used in a positive manner?¶ Just to be clear, I think it is absolutely heroic and noble what activists have done. My critique is not of peoples’ actions, or of people; it’s of a lack of sophistication, and I hold myself partly accountable, as part of the US left, for our deficiencies. With Hurricane Sandy, the Occupy folks did some amazing stuff. Yet, at a certain level, their actions became charity. People were talking about how many meals they distributed. That’s charity. That is, in many ways, a neoliberal solution. That’s exactly what the capitalist system in the US would like: US citizens not demanding their government redistribute wealth from the 1% to the 99%. The capitalists love to see people turn to each other for money and aid. Unwittingly, that’s what the anarcho-liberal left fell into.¶ This is partly due a very American style of anti-state rhetoric that transcends left and right. The state is not just prisons or the military. It’s also Head Start, quality public education, the library, clean water, the EPA, the City University of New York system – a superb, affordable set of schools that turns out top-notch, working-class students with the lowest debt burdens in the country. There’s a reason the right is attacking these institutions. Why does the right hate the EPA and public education? Because they don’t want to pay to educate the working class, and they don’t want the working class educated. They don’t want to pay to clean up industry, and that’s what the EPA forces them to do. When the left embraces anarcho-liberal notions of self-help and fantasies of being outside of both government and the market, it cuts itself off from important democratic resources. The state should be seen as an arena of class struggle.¶ When the left turns its back on the social democratic features of government, stops making demands of the state, and fails to reshape government by using the government for progressive ends, it risks playing into the hands of the right. The central message of the American right is that government is bad and must be limited. This message is used to justify austerity. However, in most cases, neoliberal austerity does not actually involve a reduction of government. Typically, restructuring in the name of austerity is really just a transformation of government, not a reduction of it.¶ Over the last 35 years, the state has been profoundly transformed, but it has not been reduced. The size of the government in the economy has not gone down. The state has become less redistributive, more punitive. Instead of a robust program of government-subsidized and public housing, we have the prison system. Instead of well-funded public hospitals, we have profiteering private hospitals funded by enormous amounts of public money. Instead of large numbers of well-paid public workers, we have large budgets for private firms that now subcontract tasks formerly conducted by the government.¶ We need to defend the progressive work of government, which, for me, means immediately defending public education. To be clear, I do not mean merely vote or ask nicely, I mean movements should attack government and government officials, target them with protests, make their lives impossible until they comply. This was done very well with the FCC. And my hat goes off to the activists who saved the internet for us. The left should be thinking about the ways in which it can leverage government. The utility of government was very apparent in Vermont during the aftermath of Hurricane Irene. The rains from that storm destroyed or damaged over a hundred bridges, many miles of road and rail, and swept away houses. Thirteen towns were totally stranded. There was a lot of incredible mutual aid; people just started clearing debris and helping each other out. But within all this, town government was a crucial connective tissue.¶ Due to the tradition of New England town meeting, people are quite involved with their local government. Anarchists should love town meetings. It is no coincidence that Murray Bookchin spent much of his life in Vermont. Town meetings are a form of participatory budgeting without the lefty rigmarole. More importantly, the state government managed to get a huge amount of support from the federal government. The state in turn pushed this down to the town level. Without that federal aid, Vermont would still be in ruins. Vermont is not a big enough political entity to shake down General Electric, a huge employer in Vermont. The Vermont government can’t pressure GE to pay for the rebuilding of local infrastructure, but the federal government can.¶ Vermont would still be a disaster if it didn’t get a transfer of funds and materials from the federal government. Similarly in New York City, the public sector does not get enough praise for the many things it did well after super storm Sandy. Huge parts of the subway system were flooded, yet it was all up and running within the month.¶ As an aside, one of the dirty little secrets about the Vermont economy is that it’s heavily tied-up with the military industrial complex. People think Vermont is all about farming and boutique food processing. Vermont has a pretty diverse economy, but agriculture plays a much smaller role than you might think, about 2 percent of employment. Meanwhile, the state’s industrial sector, along with the government, is one of the top employers, at about 13 percent of all employment. Most of this work is in what’s called precision manufacturing, making stuff like: high performance nozzles, switches, calibrators, and stuff like the lenses used in satellites, or handcrafting the blades that go in GE jet engines. But I digress … As we enter the crisis of climate change, it’s important to be aware of the actually existing legal and institutional mechanisms with which we can contain and control capital.¶ I often joke with my anarchist and libertarian friends and ask if their mutual-aid collectives can run Chicago’s sanitation system or operate satellites. Of course, on one level, I’m joking, but on another level, I’m being quite serious. I don’t think activists on the left properly understand the complexity of modern society. A simple example would be how much sewage is produced in a single day in a country with 330 million people. How do people expect to manage these day-to-day issues? In your opinion, is there a lack of sophistication on the left in terms of what, exactly, the state does and how it functions in our day-to-day lives?¶ It’s sobering to reflect on just how complex the physical systems of modern society are. And though it is very unpopular to say among most American activists, it is important to think about the hierarchies and bureaucracies that are necessarily part of technologically complex systems. A friend of mine is a water engineer in Detroit, and he was talking to me about exactly what you’re mentioning. The sewer system in Detroit is mind-bogglingly enormous and also very dilapidated and very expensive. To not have infrastructure publicly maintained, even though the capitalist class might not admit this, would ultimately undermine capital accumulation.¶ You asked if there is a lack of sophistication. Look, I’m trying to make helpful criticisms to my comrades on the left, particularly to activists who work so hard and valiantly. I’ve criticized divestment as a strategy, yet I support it. I criticized the false claims that divesting fossil fuels stocks would hurt fossil fuel companies. The fossil fuel divestment movement started out making that claim. To its credit, the movement has stopped making such claims. Now, they say that it will remove the industries "social license," which is a problematic concept that comes from the odious world of "corporate social responsibility." However, now, students are becoming politicized, and that’s always great news.¶ For several years, some of us have been trying to get climate activists, the climate left, to take the EPA and the Clean Air Act seriously. The EPA has the power to actually de-carbonize the economy. The divestment logic is: Schools will divest, then fossil fuel companies will be held in greater contempt than they are now? Honestly, they’re already hated by everybody. That does what? That creates the political pressure to stop polluting? We already have those regulations: the Clean Air Act. There was a Supreme Court Case, Massachusetts v. EPA, that was ruled on in 2007. It said the EPA must regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Lots of professional activists in the climate movement, at least up until very recently, have been totally unaware of this.¶ Consequently, they are not making demands of the EPA. They are not making demands of their various local, state and federal environmental agencies. These entities should be enforcing the laws. They have the power. It’s not because the people in the climate movement are bad people or unintelligent. They’re dedicated and extremely smart. It’s because there’s an anti-state ethos within the environmental movement and a romanticization of the local. On a side note, I don’t think all of this stuff about local economies is helpful. Sometimes I think this sort of thinking doesn’t recognize how the global political economy works. The comrades at Jacobin magazine have called this anarcho-liberalism. I think that is a great way to describe the dominant ideology of US left, which is both anarchist and liberal in its sensibilities. This ideology is fundamentally about ignoring government, and instead, being obsessed with scale, size, and, by extension, authenticity. Big things are bad. Small things are good. Planning is bad. Spontaneity is good. It is as insidious as it is ridiculous. But it is the dominant worldview among the US left.¶ Do you really think that this is the best way to approach the industry, through mobilizing state resources?¶ Look, the fossil fuel industry is the most powerful force the world has ever seen. Be honest, what institution could possibly stand up to them? The state. That doesn’t mean it will. Right now, government is captured by these corporate entities. But, it has, at least in theory, an obligation to the people. And it also has the laws that we need to wipe out the fossil fuel industrial complex. This sounds fantastical and nuts, but I don’t think it is. I’ve been harping on this in articles and a little bit at the end of Tropic of Chaos. According to the Center for Biological Diversity, Nixon-era laws can be used to sue developers, polluters, etc. You might not be able to stop them, but you can slow them down. The Clean Air Act basically says that if science can show that smoke-stack pollution is harmful to human health, it has to be regulated.¶ If there was a movement really pushing the government, and making the argument that the only safe level of CO2 emissions is essentially zero … We have the law in place. We have the enabling legislation to shut down the fossil fuel industry. We should use the government to levy astronomical fines on the fossil fuel companies for pollution. And we should impose them at such a level that it would undermine their ability to remain competitive and profitable.¶ Part Two:¶ Vincent Emanuele: Much of the green washing, or capitalism’s attempt to brand itself as green, focuses on localism and anti-government, market-driven programs. Do you think this phobia of the state among the US left is a result of previous failed political experiments? How much of this ideology is imposed from outside forces?¶ Christian Parenti: Some state phobia comes from the American political mythology of rugged individualism; some comes from the fundamentally Southern, Jeffersonian tradition of states’ rights. Fear of the federal government by Southern elites goes back to the founding of the country. The Hamiltonian versus Jeffersonian positions on government are fundamental to understanding American politics. I wrote about this for Jacobin magazine in a piece called "Reading Hamilton from the Left."¶ Lurking just beneath the surface of states’ rights is, of course, plantation rights. Those plantations, places like Monticello, were America’s equivalent of feudal manors where, in a de facto sense, economic, legal and military power were all bound up together and located in the private household of the planter. Those Virginian planters were the original localistas.¶ Nor did that project end with the fall of slavery, or the end of de jure segregation in the 1960s. Southern elites didn’t want Yankees telling them what to do; how to treat their slaves, how to organize their towns, how to run their elections, how to treat the environment – none of that! The South is a resource colony and its regional elites, some of them now running multinational corporations and holding important posts in the US government, believe they have a right to do what they wish with the people and landscape. Historically, that’s a large part of what localism and local democracy meant in the South. It meant that White local elites were "free" – free to push Black people around, free to feed racist fantasies to the White working class. They didn’t want interference from the outside. So, some of that anti-statist ideology comes from that plantation tradition. Another part of it comes from the real failures and crimes of state socialism, though state socialism also had, and in Cuba still has, many successes. The social welfare record of what we used to call "actually existing socialism" was pretty impressive. But there were also the problems of repression, surveillance and bureaucratization, which were partly the result of capitalist encirclement, partly the result of the ideological hubris rooted in ideological overconfidence in the allegedly scientific power of Marxism, partly the result of simple corruption among socialism’s political class. These real problems were central themes in the Cold War West’s educational and ideological apparatus of (generally right-wing) messaging from the press and the political class. In this discourse, communism was the state, while freedom was the private sector. Thus, the United States and freedom became embodied in popular notions of the private sector and individualism.¶ Of course, the great, unmentioned contradiction in this self-fantasy is the fact that American capitalism has always been heavily, heavily dependent on the state. Modern society, despite its fantasies about itself, is intensely cooperative and collective. Look at how complex its physical systems are; that cannot be achieved without massive levels of coordination and collective cooperation, much of it provided by the rules and regulations of government. The knee-jerk anti-statism, what the folks at Jacobin call "anarcho-liberalism," is also rooted in experience. The less social power you have, the more the state is experienced as an invasive, demeaning, oppressive and potentially, very violent bureaucracy. Neoliberalism would not have gotten this far if there wasn’t an element of truth to this critique of its bureaucracy and regulation. It has also used ideas that have old cultural tractions, like freedom.¶ Such are the contradictions of the modern democratic state in capitalist society. Government is rational, supportive, humane, [and offers] redistribution in the form of Social Security, high-quality public schools, environmental regulation, the Voting Rights Act and other federal civil rights laws that have helped break hegemonic power of local and regional bigots. But government is also militarized policing, the bloated prison system, spying on a vast scale; it is child protective services taking children from loving mothers on the basis of bureaucratic traps, corrupt corporate welfare at every level from town government to federal military contracting. The racist, sexist, plutocratic and techno-bureaucratic features of the state create fertile ground for people to turn their backs on the whole idea of government. What has been the impact of the right’s ability to effectively propagandize the White working class in the US?¶ Rightist intellectuals, academics, journalists, media tycoons, university presidents and loudmouth politicians work diligently to capture and form the raw experience of everyday oppression into an ideological common sense. To be clear, I use that term in the Gramscian sense, in which common sense refers to ruling class ideology that is so hegemonic as to be absorbed and naturalized by the people. The constant libertarian assault on the radio, in newspapers, on the television, this drumbeat of anti-government discourse is an old story – but still very important for understanding the anarcho-liberal sensibility. Just tune in to AM radio late on a weekday evening and listen to the anti-government vitriol. It’s sort of wild.¶ Someone could do an interesting study, Ph.D., in unpacking the cultural history of all this. It is tempting to speculate that deindustrialization, having disempowered and made anxious many huge sections of the working class, opens the way for fantasies of empowerment. The anti-statist, rugged individualist common sense is also always simultaneously a fantasy of empowerment. White men are particularly vulnerable to these fantasies. The classic guy who calls into the batshit crazy, late night, right-wing talk radio show is a middle-aged White man. Listen closely to the rage and you hear fantasies of independence. In this rhetoric, guns and gun rights become an obviously phallic symbol of individual empowerment, agency, self worth, responsibility etc. But most importantly, we have to think about how all of this anti-state ideology is being stirred up with investments from elites. The neoliberal project is to transform the state through anti-statist rhetoric and narratives. They sell the idea that people need to be liberated from the state. But then push policies that imprison people while liberating and pampering capital. It is hard for the left to see itself in this sketch – the angry, beaten-down, middle-aged White guy calling in from his basement or garage. But I think these much-documented corporate efforts to build neoliberal consent permeate the entire culture and infect us all, if even just a little bit.¶ This is the intellectually toxic environment in which young activists are approaching the question of the climate emergency. Young activists should be approaching the climate crisis the way the left approached the economic crisis during the Great Depression. We need to drastically restructure the state. We need it mobilized and able to transform the economy. The New Deal was imperfect, of course. It left domestic workers and farm workers out of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It was inherently racist. It dammed rivers and was environmentally destructive. However, the New Deal was radical in its general empowerment of labor; its distributional outcomes were progressive and it achieved a modernizing transformation of American capitalism. Not to overstate the case, but the New Deal could be a reference point for thinking about the beginning of a green transformation that seeks to euthanize the fossil fuel industry. We have to precipitously reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build a new power sector. That much is very clear.¶ However, let me be clear: Shutting down the fossil fuel industry – mitigating the climate crisis – is not a solution for the environmental crisis. Climate change is only one part of the multifaceted environmental crisis. Shutting down the fossil fuel industry would not automatically end overfishing, deforestation, soil erosion, habitat loss, toxification of the environment etc. But carbon mitigation is the most immediately pressing issue we face. The science is very clear on this. Climate change is the portion of the overall crisis that must be solved immediately so as to buy time to deal with all the other aspects of the crisis. Because I take the political implications of climate science very seriously, I am something of a carbon fundamentalist.

# 2NC

## K---Economization

### 2NC---OV

#### 2---

#### It drives capitalist infiltration and splinters the mutual aid into individualistic disruptions that ultimately empower global capital

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, pp. 5-6)

The contradiction of capitalism is that it is an uncompromising structure of negotiation. It ruthlessly absorbs sociohistorical limits and the challenges these limits pose to capital, placing them in the service of further capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is an exclusive system premised upon the logic of property rights and the expansion of these rights, all the while maintaining that the free market is self-regulating, sufficiently and efficiently working to establish individual and collective well-being. In reality, however, socioeconomic disparities have become more acute the world over, and the world's "common wealth,” as David Bollier and later Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, has been increasingly privatized.12 In 2010, the financial wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals (with investable assets of $1 to $50 million or more [all money amounts are in U.S. dollars] ) surpassed the 2007 pre-financial crisis peak, growing 9.7 percent and reaching $42.7 trillion. Also in 2010 the global population of high-net­ worth individuals grew 8.3 percent to 10.9 million.13 In 2010, the global population was 6.9 billion, of whom there were 1,000 billionaires; 80,000 ultra-high-net-worth individuals with average wealth exceeding $50 mil­ lion; 3 billion with an average wealth of $10,000, of which 1.1 billion owned less than $1,000; and 2.5 billion who were reportedly "unbanked'' (without a bank account and thus living on the margins of the formal financial system) .14 In a world where financial advantage brings with it political benefits, these figures attest to the weak position the majority of the world occupies in the arena of environmental and climate change politics. Neoliberal capitalism ameliorates the threat posed by environmental change by taking control of the collective call it issues forth, splintering the collective into a disparate and confusing array of individual choices competing with one another over how best to solve the crisis. Through this process of competition, the collective nature of the crisis is restructured and privatized, then put to work for the production and circulation of capital as the average wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals grows at the expense of the majority of the world living in abject poverty. Advocating that the free market can solve debilitating environmental changes and the climate crisis is not a political response to these problems; it is merely a political ghost emptied of its collective aspirations.

#### 3---

#### Neoliberalism exacerbates racial violence

Haider 18 (Asad, founding Editor of Viewpoint Magazine, an investigative journal of contemporary politics, PhD candidate in the History of Consciousness at UC Santa Cruz, and a member of UAW-2865, the Student-Workers Union at the University of California, *Mistaken Identity: Race and Class in the Trump Age*, Verso, 2018)

This does not mean, however, that a “class reductionist” argument is a viable position. As long as racial solidarity among whites is more powerful than class solidarity across races, both capitalism and whiteness will continue to exist. In the context of American history, the rhetoric of the “white working class” and positivist arguments that class matters more than race reinforce one of the main obstacles to building socialism.

Allen and Ignatiev turned to this question in their further research, inspired by the insights of Du Bois. In the process they presented an exemplary model of a materialist investigation into the ideology of race, one that went from the abstract to the concrete. This work emerged alongside that of Barbara Fields and Karen Fields, David Roediger, and many others as a body of thought devoted to exposing race as a social construct. All of this research, in varying ways, has examined the history of the “white race” in its specificity. The guiding insight that must be drawn from it is that this racial phenomenon is not simply a biological or even cultural attribute of certain “white people”: it was produced by white supremacy in a concrete and objective historical process. As Allen put it on the back cover of his extraordinary vernacular history The Invention of the White Race: “When the first Africans arrived in Virginia in 1619, there were no white people there.”

At the most immediate level, Allen was pointing to the fact that the word white didn’t appear in Virginia colonial law until 1691. Of course, this doesn’t mean that there was no racism before 1691. Allen’s argument was to show that racism was not attached to a concept of the white race. There were ideas of the superiority of European civilization, but this did not correspond to differences in skin color.

The clearest example is that of the Irish, whose racial oppression by the English precedes their racial oppression of Africans by several centuries. Today white nationalists distort this history, attempting to use the racial oppression of the Irish to try to dismiss the history of white supremacy. Yet this example actually demolishes their entire framework. What the example of the Irish illustrates is a form of racial oppression that is not based on skin color and that in fact precedes the very category of whiteness.

Indeed, the early forms of English racial ideology represented the Irish as inferior and subhuman, and this ideology was later repeated word for word to justify both the genocide of Indigenous people in the Americas and the enslavement of Africans. Nor was it only a matter of words: the very practices of settler colonialism, land seizures, and plantation production were established in Ireland. Allen demonstrates this with reference to specific laws:

If under Anglo-American slavery, “the rape of a female slave was not a crime, but a mere trespass on the master’s property,” so, in 1278, two Anglo-Normans, brought into court and charged with raping Margaret O’Rorke were found not guilty because “the said Margaret is an Irishwoman.” If a law enacted in Virginia in 1723, provided that, “manslaughter of a slave is not punishable,” so under Anglo-Norman law it sufficed for acquittal to show that the victim in a slaying was Irish. Anglo-Norman priests granted absolution on the grounds that it was “no more sin to kill an Irishman than a dog or any other brute.”9

So racial oppression arises in the Irish case without skin color as its basis. We are forced to ask how we end up with a racial ideology revolving around skin color that represents African people as subhuman and that considers both Irish and English to be part of a unitary “white race.”

The historical record quite clearly demonstrates that white supremacy and thus the white race are formed within the American transition to capitalism, specifically because of the centrality of racial slavery. However, we have to resist the temptation, imposed on us by racial ideology, to explain slavery through race. Slavery is not always racial. It existed in ancient Greece and Rome and also in Africa, and was not attached specifically to a racial ideology. Slavery is a form of forced labor characterized by the market exchange of the laborer. But there are various forms of forced labor, and its first form in Virginia was indentured labor, in which a laborer is forced to work for a limited period of time to work off a debt, often with some incentive like land ownership after the end of the term. The first Africans to arrive in Virginia 1619 were put to work as indentured servants, within the same legal category as European indentured servants. In fact, until 1660 all African American laborers, like their European American counterparts, were indentured servants who had limited terms of servitude. There was no legal differentiation based on racial ideology: free African Americans owned property, land, and sometimes indentured servants of their own. There were examples of intermarriage between Europeans and Africans. It was only in the late seventeenth century that the labor force of the American colonies shifted decisively to African slaves who did not have limits on their terms of servitude.

As Painter points out in The History of White People, these forms of labor and their transformations are fundamental in understanding how racial ideology comes about:

Work plays a central part in race talk, because the people who do the work are likely to be figured as inherently deserving the toil and poverty of laboring status. It is still assumed, wrongly, that slavery anywhere in the world must rest on a foundation of racial difference. Time and again, the better classes have concluded that those people deserve their lot; it must be something within them that puts them at the bottom. In modern times, we recognize this kind of reasoning as it relates to black race, but in other times the same logic was applied to people who were white, especially when they were impoverished immigrants seeking work.10

“In sum,” Painter writes, “before an eighteenth-century boom in the African slave trade, between one-half and two-thirds of all early white immigrants to the British colonies in the Western Hemisphere came as unfree laborers, some 300,000 to 400,000 people.”11 The definitions of whiteness as freedom and blackness as slavery did not yet exist.

It turns out that defining race involves answering some unexpected historical questions: How did some indentured servants come to be forced into bondage for their entire lives rather than a limited term? How did this category of forced labor come to be represented in terms of race? Why did the colonial ruling class come to rely on racial slavery when various other regimes of labor were available?

The first economic boom of the American colonies was in Virginia tobacco production in the 1620s, and it was based on the labor of primarily European indentured servants. African Americans were only about a fifth of the labor force: most forced labor was initially European, and the colonial planter class relied on this forced labor for its economic growth. But they couldn’t just rely on European indentured labor because it was based on voluntary migration, and the incentive to participate in a life of brutal labor and die early was not sufficient to generate a consistently growing workforce. As Barbara Fields puts it, “Neither white skin nor English nationality protected servants from the grossest forms of brutality and exploitation. The only degradation they were spared was perpetual enslavement along with their issue in perpetuity, the fate that eventually befell the descendants of Africans.”12

African Americans, on the other hand, had been forcibly removed from their homelands. So the ruling class began to alter its laws to be able to deny some laborers an end to their terms of servitude, which they were only able to accomplish in the case of African laborers. What really changed everything was Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676. This began as a conflict within the elite planter class, directed toward a brutal attack on the Indigenous population. But it also gave rise to a rebellious mob of European and African laborers, who burned down the capital city of Jamestown and forced the governor to flee. The insurrectionary alliance of European and African laborers was a fundamental existential threat to the colonial ruling class, and the possibility of such an alliance among exploited peoples had to be prevented forever.

Here we see a watershed moment in the long and complex process of the invention of the white race as a form of social control. The ruling class shifted its labor force decisively toward African slaves, and thus avoided dealing with the demand of indentured servants for eventual freedom and landownership. It fortified whiteness as a legal category, the basis for denying an end to the term of servitude for African forced labor. By the eighteenth century the Euro-American planter class had entered into a bargain with the Euro-American laboring classes, who were mostly independent subsistence farmers: it exchanged certain social privileges for a cross-class alliance of Euro-Americans to preserve a superexploited African labor force. This Euro-American racial alliance was the best defense of the ruling class against the possibility of a Euro-American and African American working-class alliance. It is at this point, Nell Painter concludes, that we see the “now familiar equation that converts race to black and black to slave.”13

The invention of the white race further accelerated when the Euro-American ruling class encountered a new problem in the eighteenth century. As the colonial ruling class began to demand its independence from the divinely ordained executives and landed wealth of the English nobility, they made claims for the intrinsic equality of all people and the idea of natural rights. As Barbara Fields puts it:

Racial ideology supplied the means of explaining slavery to people whose terrain was a republic founded on radical doctrines of liberty and natural rights, and, more important, a republic in which those doctrines seemed to represent accurately the world in which all but a minority lived. Only when the denial of liberty became an anomaly apparent even to the least observant and reflective members of Euro-American society did ideology systematically explain the anomaly.14

In other words, the Euro-American ruling class had to advance an ideology of the inferiority of Africans in order to rationalize forced labor, and they had to incorporate European populations into the category of the white race, despite the fact that many of these populations had previously been considered inferior.

This racial ideology developed further as the new American nation encountered the phenomenon of the voluntary migration of free laborers from Europe, many of whom came from populations that were viewed as distinct European races: the Italians, Eastern Europeans, and Jews, but especially the exemplary case of the Irish, whose emigration to the US spiked with the famines of the mid-nineteenth century produced by English colonialism.

The Irish, among the most oppressed and rebellious groups in Europe, were offered the bargain that had protected the American ruling class. Frederick Douglass pointed this out very clearly in 1853, at the anniversary meeting of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in New York:

The Irish, who, at home, readily sympathize with the oppressed everywhere, are instantly taught when they step upon our soil to hate and despise the Negro. They are taught to believe that he eats the bread that belongs to them. The cruel lie is told them, that we deprive them of labor and receive the money which would otherwise make its way into their pockets. Sir, the Irish-American will find out his mistake one day.15

Douglass had gone to Ireland to avoid being returned to slavery and said he was for the first time in his life treated as an ordinary person, exclaiming in a letter to the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, “I breathe, and lo! the chattel becomes a man … I meet nothing to remind me of my complexion.”16 Of course, this was not because of some intrinsic kindness of the Irish. It was rather because, at this stage in history, there were no white people there. This was clear to Douglass because he arrived during the Great Famine. Writing in his memoirs of the songs sung by slaves on the American plantations, he added: “Nowhere outside of dear old Ireland, in the days of want and famine, have I heard sounds so mournful.”17

But what Irish immigrants realized after immigrating to the United States is that they could ameliorate their subjugation by joining the club of the white race, as Ignatiev has recounted.18 They could become members of a “white race” with higher status if they actively supported the continuing enslavement and oppression of African Americans. So the process of becoming white meant that these previous racial categories were abolished and racialized groups like the Irish were progressively incorporated into the white race as a means of fortifying and intensifying the exploitation of black laborers.

It was the great insight of Frederick Douglass to describe this as the Irish-American’s mistake. Douglass clearly emphasized the novelty of the very description of people as white: “The word white is a modern term in the legislation of this country. It was never used in the better days of the Republic, but has sprung up within the period of our national degeneracy.”19 Let us be clear on what the invention of the white race meant. It meant that Euro-American laborers were prevented from joining with African American laborers in rebellion, through the form of social control imposed by the Euro-American ruling class. In exchange for white-skin privilege, the Euro-American workers accepted white identity and became active agents in the brutal oppression of African American laborers. But they also fundamentally degraded their own conditions of existence. As a consequence of this bargain with their exploiters, they allowed the conditions of the Southern white laborer to become the most impoverished in the nation, and they generated conditions that blocked the development of a viable mass workers’ movement.

This is why the struggle against white supremacy has in fact been a struggle for universal emancipation—something that was apparent to African American insurgents. As Barbara Fields points out, these insurgents did not use a notion of race as an explanation for their oppression or their struggles for liberation:

It was not Afro-Americans … who needed a racial explanation; it was not they who invented themselves as a race. Euro-Americans resolved the contradiction between slavery and liberty by defining Afro-Americans as a race; Afro-Americans resolved the contradiction more straightforwardly by calling for the abolition of slavery. From the era of the American, French and Haitian revolutions on, they claimed liberty as theirs by natural right.20

However, this was not always recognized by socialist movements. Early American socialists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sometimes failed to recognize that the division between white and black workers prevented all workers from successfully emancipating themselves. We should not oversimplify this point or use it to discredit the whole history of the labor movement. The early socialist parties were largely composed of immigrants who were often not yet fully incorporated into the white race, and there were very significant black socialists—including, for example, Hubert Harrison, who played an important role in connecting black nationalism to socialism at the beginning of the twentieth century. The majority of the early American socialists were not racists, and in fact openly and vigorously opposed racism.

### 2NC---AT: PIKS

#### Framing the K as ‘theft’ cedes to the capitalist assumption of private property, which is exploitative

Weisser 18 – Nathan Weisser, Public Relations and Graphics Designer at Works24, “The Circular Drain of Vagueness that is the Phrase, "Private Property is Theft"”, 3-30, <https://www.minds.com/blog/view/826516303619190784> [grammar edit in brackets]

A lot of people who follow the ideology of Marxism believe that the root of all evil can be boiled down [to] the exploitative nature of private property. Their idea has merit, because we face a problem on Earth: that there is a finite amount of resources, specifically land, and a potentially infinite amount of people to take up those resources. Therefore, by owning a stake in some of those finite resources, you are exercising exploitative practices over that infinite amount of people that need those resources and then must labor to get them from you.

So, a problem as been defined: finite resources, infinite populace.

The problem with Marxism, which I am using as a synonym for both Socialism and Communism, is that they try to solve this problem with bending the very fabric of nature around the fact that the problem exists, and seek to abolish the entire natural relationships of trade, voluntary labor, and currency to atone for the problem, instead of trying to solve the problem within the means of our reality.

Here's the memeable TL;DR of the point I'm trying to make:

"Private Property is Theft" is a paradox. The word "Theft", according to Marriam-Webster means, "the act of stealing; specifically : the felonious taking and removing of personal property with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it". So, by merely using the word "theft" in your language, you have to cede to the reality that private (or personal) property is a fundamental right of the individual that is being stolen from.

I debate a lot on r/CapitalismVSocialism, (can't wait to not be on Reddit anymore) and you'll find that Marxists do take this belief to be the very center of their worldview. As a result of their entire worldview being boiled down to a paradox, they are forced into going into extreme vagueries every time they are confronted with an opposing view. It would be funny if it weren't so frustrating, because their vaguries are successful from time to time. Their step-by-step process to making progress goes like this:

1. Identify a problem inherit to reality

2. Staple that problem not on to reality itself, but on to people more successful than they

3. Get the whole world to recognize the problem

4. Say "it's this guy's fault", and watch the public feed.

#### Contingent disagreement is good---we shouldn’t have to disagree with the whole 1AC---key to effective rev v rev debates and idea refinement

Williams ‘15 Douglas Williams is a third-generation organizer, He earned his BA in Political Science at the University of Minnesota at Morris and his MPA at the University of Missouri Columbia, where he was also a Thurgood Marshall Fellow and a Stanley Botner Fellow. He is currently a doctoral student in political science at Wayne State University in Detroit, where his research centers around public policy as it relates to disadvantaged communities and the labor movement. From the article: “The Dead End of Identity Politics” - From: The South Lawn - March 10, 2015 – Internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer, Purdue University. DeBoer holds a PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue and an MA in English, concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, Modified for potentially objectionable language. In one instance a capital “B” was adjusted to a lower case “b” in a manner that boosted readability, but did not alter context. https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/

Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: “This all largely descends from a related condition: many in the broad online left have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. B(b)ut critique drift demonstrates why a healthy, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately disarms (hampers) the left. Refusing to say ‘*this* is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making *that* accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.”

----- (Williams is now no longer quoting DeBoer)

Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness and there will be no need for coalitions, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed. But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and see one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

#### It presumes a regressive understanding of discourse as static and intentioned that’s been disproven by waves of theoretical advancement in rhetorical studies

Young 11 – Dr. Kelly Michael Young, Professor of Communication at Wayne State University, PhD in Communication Studies from Wayne State University, MA in Communication Studies from Ball State University, BS in Secondary Education from Ball State University, “IMPOSSIBLE CONVICTIONS: CONVICTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY IN PERFORMANCE AND SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE”, Contemporary Argumentation & Debate, p. 6-19

Despite the fact that the theorists who provide the strongest defense for the performative power of discourse draw from Austin (1975) and Derrida (1988), very few debaters read evidence or base their arguments within the performative frameworks articulated by these theorists. As a result, much of academic debate’s engagement with the exciting possibilities offered by this literature is lost as the students selectively adopt in self-serving fashion from this work. Examples of these self-serving practices include the debaters who present a hodge-podge of arguments from various critical theorists to generate offensive responses to opponents’ arguments with no understanding of the implications and contractions created at the intersections of those theorists’ ideas. Or, they realize that there are contradictions but know that it would take the other side too long to explain them and so these problems are simply glossed over. Worse, many of the debate practices adopted to defend elements of performance debate may run contrary to this literature base. For example, opponents of performative arguments will often run quasi-counterplans that select and advocate parts of the 1AC performance or permute part of the negative’s performative framework. In response, teams will contend that their opponents cannot “just snatch [the performance] and add it [to their speech]….Kritik is a verb, and not a noun, which means you have to do it in order for it to be done” (Evans, 2011a, para. 15). Similarly, teams will contend that their opponents’ attempt to capture part of their performance is inauthentic and insincere because they did not initiate the performance (Zompetti, 2004). However, given Butler’s (1997) and Derrida’s (1988) perspectives on the performative, which will be discussed at length later in this essay, these claims to an authentic and sincere performance are perhaps problematic. Before we turn to that discussion, I want to explore a second recent development that relates to sincerity and convictions: the contemporary debate about the ethics and effect of switch-sides debate (SSD).

The Debate about SSD

1950-1960s: SSD as Unethical Indoctrination

Speech communication journals have hosted a number of debates about the ethical implications of the debate tournament practice of having students debate both sides of a given proposition. With the rise of tournamentstyle debate competitions in the 1930s, debate educators became highly concerned about the ethical and pedagogical value of having students debate against their convictions by having to switch sides on a topic each round. In 1954, the selection of the national college debate topic, Resolved: that the United States should extend diplomatic recognition to the communist government of China, generated a great deal of controversy (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief, & Woods., 2007). At the height of the Cold War and McCarthyism, a number of schools such as the military academies refused to affirm the topic in fear that affirmation would “indoctrinate America’s youth, while giving aid and comfort to the enemy” (English et al., 2007, p. 222).

Within this context, Murphy (1957) outlines the fundamental objection to SSD in arguing, “debate…is a form of public speaking. A public statement is a public commitment. Before one takes the platform, [he/she] should study the question, [he/she] should discuss it until [he/she] knows where [he/she] stands. Then [he/ she] should take that stand” (p. 2). In his review of public speaking ethics literature, Murphy (1957) contends that when students argue against their convictions, they are both immoral and “public liar[s]” (p. 2). To avoid this, Murphy (1957) argues that students should debate only from their sincere beliefs.

In their response to Murphy (1957), both Cripe (1957) and Dell (1958) maintain that tournament-style debating is a unique form of analytic speaking that is different than persuasive debate about political conviction. As such, both scholars suggest that there is great pedagogical value to viewing controversies from both sides within an educational setting. Additionally, Dell (1958) contends that because all ethics are contextual, SSD should be seen as an ethical practice. Of the many arguments raised and debated, the two most frequently discussed were: (1) that debate tournaments are or are not public speaking situations; and (2) that SSD does or does not teach essential logical skills necessary to avoid dogmatism (Cripe, 1957; Galloway, 2007; Murphy, 1957). Put differently, Cripe (1957) explains, “the whole problem seems to be one of definition, of defining what ‘debate’ is, and what ‘ethical’ means” (p. 209).

Central to these broader ethics arguments is the status of students’ convictions. For instance, according to Murphy (1957), students are most likely to have welldeveloped convictions prior to engaging in debate and SSD only creates confusion for students in what they sincerely believe. In response, Cripe (1957) and Dell (1958) maintain that debaters can separate their true feelings while making the best possible case for a different side for the purposes of competition. In addition, they refute Murphy’s argument that students have firm convictions on a number of complicated topics prior to debating. As they conclude, students’ true beliefs are likely underdeveloped and can be best clarified and strengthened by SSD. Additionally, according to Cripe (1957) and Dell (1958), SSD helps develop good future citizens because it best guards against the development of rigid ideological views. Summarizing the debate aptly, Greene and Hicks (2005) conclude, “at the heart of the ‘debate about debate’…was the idea of conviction and how it should guide the moral economy of liberal citizenship” (p. 100).

In their later review of the controversy, Klopf and McCroskey (1964) maintain that the debate over the ethics of SSD is over. As they explain,

The relative ethic has been accepted by a large majority of those involved directly with academic debate. Both by their opinions and their actions they believe switch-sides debating is ethical. So do we. The controversy over the ethics of debating both sides is [finished]! (para. 25-26)

While the majority of coaches and directors may have declared SSD ethical, the status and importance of student convictions remained up for debate, as we see in another debate 40 years later.

2000s: SSD as Cultural Technology of Imperialism

Greene and Hicks (2005) revisited the 1950-1960s debate to interrogate the cultural effect that results from the promotion of SSD debate as a corrective for intransigence. Rather than assess the ethical implications of SSD on students, Greene and Hicks (2005) examine: The articulation of the debate community as a zone of dissent against McCarthyist tendencies developed into a larger and somewhat uncritical affirmation of switch-side debate as a “technology” of liberal participatory democracy….tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. (English et al., 2007, p. 223-224) In advancing this argument, Greene and Hicks (2005) contend that SSD creates a gap between a student’s “embodied speech act and his/her speech convictions” that allows for the privileging of a method of conflict resolution that is based on reason rather than beliefs or authority (p. 120). As they conclude, the controversy “pre-figures how a deliberative theory of democracy requires a moral theory of the subject to prepare that subject for the transformational potential associated with the ‘gentle force of the better argument’” (Greene & Hicks, 2005, p. 120). Greene and Hicks’ implied alternative to SSD returns to the earlier form of debate that “privileges personal conviction” as the governing element of debate (Stannard, 2006, para. 32). In doing so, they suggest that academic debate should close the gap between the speech act of debate and the individual’s first order convictions.

Following Greene and Hicks’ (2005) lead, Massey (2006a) calls on academic debate coaches to reform SSD in order to allow students debating on the affirmative of a topic the space to express their true beliefs. Somewhat mirroring Murphy’s (1957) concerns, Massey (2006a) maintains that “we should not separate speech from conviction…discourse creates reality, and we must examine the effects that verbalizing things [students] might disagree with could have on the [audience]” (para. 17). In a different argument, Massey (2006a) is concerned that students are harmed by SSD because recent debate resolutions always require the affirmative to defend action by the United States federal government and state action. As he further explains, affirmative debaters must always debate from an “exceptionalists view” without ever interrogating the federal government’s role in causing a host of problems (Massey, 2006a, para. 11). Consequently, Massey (2006a) contends that SSD

…forces a one way ideological conformity, rather than a give and take reflection that most proponents of switch side debate want to presume. My position is debate can be a training ground for discussing those issues that are important to debaters, and giving students agency for dealing with your own personal oppressions and inequalities. (para. 11)

To best capture the benefits of SSD, Massey (2006b) claims that students on the negative are required to refute whatever the affirmative team presents, which gains “all the benefits of switch side debate” (para. 2). Ultimately, Massey’s criticism has less to do with Greene and Hicks’s (2005) concern with the cultural effect of promoting a certain model of liberal citizenship and more with the potential exceptionalist effect that having to defend the United States federal government has on students. However, like Greene and Hicks, Massey privileges the verbal expression of conviction as what should regulate student advocacy.

In response to Greene and Hicks (and as an effect, responding to Massey as well), English et al. (2007) defend SSD in arguing that “rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (p. 224). Similarly, Stannard (2006) contends that conviction-driven debate would produce “simultaneous zones of speech activism” that cause students to be:

…so wrapped up in their own micropolitics, or so busy preaching to themselves and their choirs, that they will never understand or confront the rhetorical tropes used to mobilize both resource and true believers in the service of continued material domination. (para. 35)

Thus, for English et al. (2007) and Stannard (2006), SSD is a technology that prevents the very moral and cultural problems that concern Greene and Hicks (2005) and Massey (2006a).

In an additional defense, Galloway (2007) outlines a dialogic model of competitive debate that “preserves the affirmative team’s obligation to uphold the debate resolution” while, at the same time, allowing the speech act of the debater to take a number of forms (e.g., critical, performative, policy) (p. 2). Once offered, the affirmative speech act awaits response from the negative. The promise of the model, according to Galloway (2007), is that it preserves the stable predictability of a resolution while allowing debaters to engage these propositions in a number of ways. In making this argument, Galloway (2007) responds to advocates of conviction-driven debate in contending that SSD does not cause students to lose their beliefs. Instead, “conviction is not a priori to discussion, it flows from it” through the testing of ideas and beliefs (p. 11).

Ultimately, both debates about SSD are founded on the idea that student convictions are important. However, what is disputed is the impact that communication has on these convictions. For instance, for the opponents of SSD, conviction exists prior to public debate and is grounded in the sincere intentions of the speaker (Murphy, 1957). Yet, these beliefs are fragile, as they are always at risk of being corrupted and lost in public argument. For the supporters of SSD, conviction is something discovered, tested, and sustained through public speech acts. While both of these positions bank a great deal on the importance and role of student convictions in speech acts, there is no discussion in these debates about how students construct or convey these beliefs through communication and performance. Given that academic debate remains a communication activity, how we convey our sincere beliefs and what effect those speech acts have are rather important issues to explore. In that vein, the next section of this essay explores the speech act theories of Austin, Butler, and Derrida and their implications for these debates about sincere beliefs and performance.

Speech Act, Performance Theory, and Convictions

As my review of both performance debate theory and the reoccurring debate over SSD suggests, a number of questions about the expression of convictions remain unanswered. For instance, how do we recognize that students are debating from their true beliefs? What effect do these convictions have on debates? What are the effects of using convictions as the governing principle to evaluate speech acts or promote competitive debate? Before answers to these questions can be discerned, I now turn to speech act theory, as it may provide a number of insights into the underlying concerns about student convictions in competitive debate.

Austin’s Speech Act Theory

For many years in linguistic and rhetorical study, the prevailing explanation of the operation of linguistics was that the conscious speaker and his/her sincere intentions controlled the meaning of communication within a rhetorical situation (Culler, 1981). Argumentation and communication scholarship also often presumed that the “primary purpose of language was to be descriptive or make true or false (constantive) statements about the world” (Alfino, 1991, p. 144). However, Austin (1975) maintains that several statements do not fit within the constantive category. Rather, many utterances “actually perform the action to which they refer (e.g., ‘I promise to pay you tomorrow’)” (Culler, 1981, p. 16). In his work, Austin (1975) argues that these performative statements, rather than being a special case, constitute a majority of statements while the constantive is a special case of the performative.

Austin (1975) also identifies two levels of effect for any speech act to further clarify the nature and use of performative utterances. The first is the perlocutionary effect, which is the psychological consequences of the speech act, which include motivating and persuading an immediate audience. In swaying or moving the audience, the speech act may convince someone to change his/her feelings or thoughts or even take action. But these changes may be indirect as they affect an intermediary person and occur over time as a result of the original speech act (Butler, 1997). The second level is illocutionary force, which is the performative effects of declaring, identifying, promising, and requesting. As Austin (1975) explains, illocutionary force is the “performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something” (pp. 99-100). Illocutionary force is a direct consequence of a speech act; however, the force of the speech act is not located within “merely a single moment” and cannot succeed with just a simple utterance (Butler, 1997, p. 3). Rather, illocutionary effects rely on a number of prior conventions and rituals. For example, as Austin (1975) suggests, successful illocutionary acts depend on a number of conditions:

(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, (A.2) the particular person and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. (B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and (B.2) completely. (pp. 14-15)

In outlining these various conditions for effective performances, Austin seeks to demonstrate that the conditions and conventions of a given context are what control the illocutionary effect of discourse. In doing so, he privileges convention and context over the consciousness and intentions of speakers as the source of performative effect.

While elevating the importance of context over speaker’s intentions, Austin (1975) also awkwardly seeks to exclude non-serious, or what he calls “parasitic,” speech acts (p. 22). For instance, he considers performances by an actor or statements made in jest as intelligible yet parasitic uses of language. Yet, in excluding these fake or infelicitous speech acts, Austin (1975) inadvertently privileges the conscious speaker and his/her sincere intentions as the center of his speech act system—the very thing he sought to avoid (Bérubé, 2004).

Derrida and Butler’s Speech Act Theory

In highlighting the shortcoming of Austin’s (1975) desire to preserve conscious intentions and sincerity, Derrida (1988) asks: can communication have an inherent, intended and sincere meaning? In responding to his own question, Derrida (1988) maintains that sincere intentions cannot control a speech act because it is constantly repeatable—iterable—as it is cited and recited by different speakers in different contexts. While the speaker might have a genuine purpose in making a statement, as the statement is used and repeated by other speakers in different contexts, the meaning and the force of the statement changes. For example, if debate students use this article as evidence in a debate brief, I cannot control how they use material from this essay in their arguments. As more and more students cite the argument, we all become multiple “authors” of the speech act. Likewise, my citation of various scholars within this essay creates an assemblage of ideas that have very different meaning and force once combined into this article. Thus, while many people helped create this document, the absence of their intent and presence allows me to deploy their ideas and thoughts in different ways.

Influenced by de Saussure’s (1972) notions of linguistic structuralism, absence and presence, and diachronic studies of meaning and Barthes’s (1977) work on the “death of the author,” Derrida contends, that the “structure of absence” in all uses of language allows all utterances to be endlessly cited and iterated (Alfino, 1991, p. 146). This inherent possibility of continuous citation and repetition, according to Derrida, is the very condition in which discourse remains meaningful and has effect, even if the meaning is different in each new context (Alfino, 1991). Within Derrida’s (1988) system of speech acts, authorial intent does not disappear, but instead must be understood as an effect that “no longer [is] able to govern the entire scene and the system of utterance” (p. 20). Additionally, the privileging of the author’s sincere intentions and beliefs in an appropriate context for a performance should be understood as an attempt to restrict the infinite meanings of the performance (Stocker, 2006). In addition, Derrida (1988) contends that sincere intentions and beliefs cannot control systems of meaning because we cannot read the speaker’s mind, our communication always expresses more than we anticipate, and intention and belief is never fully present to the speaker due to the unconscious. Consequently, what matters most in a speech act is how context makes possible the structure, conventions, and meaning of communication.

In making these arguments, Derrida (1988) maintains what Austin wants to exclude—the non-serious and infelicitous performance. In doing so, Derrida argues that the possibility of non-serious or fake performances and reiterations of performances demonstrate that intentionality and sincerity do not regulate the absolute meaning of a speech act. Instead, the system is never fully closed. Rather, it is porous and constantly open to change due to the context and conventions within and outside the immediate context in which the performance occurs (Derrida, 1988).

In her ruminations about the nature of injurious speech and the problems associated with censorship, Butler (1997) builds on Austin’s and Derrida’s works to argue that a structural gap between intention and sincerity and an utterance is necessary in order for language to have agency. Like Derrida, Butler (1997) contends that language and speech acts are always plagued with excess. As she further explains, the speech act is “always to some extent unknowing about what it performs, that it always says something that it does not intend” (Butler, 1997, p. 10). Even in the situation where a predetermined topic is up for discussion – like a resolution for debate – Butler (1997) would contend that meaning remains unsettled because the words in the topic and the arguments made for either side of the topic do not have stable meaning. For instance, thousands of debates each year occur under a shared national debate resolution, yet each debate is significantly different than the other, even when they deal with similar sub-sets of the resolution. The very fact that there is no consensus on what a debate resolution precisely means at the end of a debate season and debates are performed so differently under one topic throughout a season demonstrates the play and excess of speech acts. This structural inability to master or control our performances and speech acts for Butler (1997) does not mark the failure of communication; instead, it serves as its radical potential. For example, without a gap between intention and beliefs and utterance, discourse is unrecoverable and fixed. However, if a gap does exist, contested and once harmful words like “queer” can be re-appropriated and given new meaning within different contexts by different speakers. This does not mean that the discourse is acceptable uncritically; rather, the new use of the terms demonstrate the exclusive nature of the rhetoric and produces a democratic contestation over formerly racist or misogynist discourse that extend the range of the term. For instance, the activist group Queer Nation re-appropriates the term “queer” in order to contest the exclusive nature of labels such as “gay,” “lesbian,” or “homosexual.” In doing so, the group seeks to highlight the homophobic fear of what is “queer” by turning the term against itself, as the group’s motto, “We’re here. We’re Queer. Get used to it!” signifies (Brontsema, 2012). Another example of re-appropriation can be seen as a result of the recent decision by Arizona’s Tucson Unified School District to ban certain books from the district’s Mexican-American Studies program. The action caused several activists to form the Librotraficante Caravan, an underground and traveling library featuring the work of writers who were banned by the district. The group’s name – book trafficker – and tactics reclaim a number of negative stereotypes surrounding immigration, like the underground smuggling/trafficking of goods (Steiner, 2012). Through this re-appropriation over time, these terms lose their harmful effect and can be used in new and powerful ways through iteration (Butler, 1993, 1997).

Due to this break between belief, intent, and rhetoric, the force and power of discourse cannot be located in a single speech act. As Butler (1997) explains in the context of hate speech, “racist speech works through the invocation of convention; it circulates, and though it requires a subject for its speaking, it neither begins nor ends with the subject who speaks or with the specific name that is used” (p. 34). In other words, the illocutionary force of a speech act comes from the prior conventions and citational history that both precedes and conditions the use of particular discourse. While an individual can be liable for what is said at a perlocutionary level, reprimanding and rejecting the speech act does little to curb the force and power of the discourse at an illocutionary level of uptake. Indeed, such attempts actually lock into place injurious speech, “preserving their power to injure, and arresting the possibility of a reworking that might shift their context and purpose” (Butler, 1997, p. 38). Instead of preserving this injurious history, efforts to reclaim or re-signify discourse require laying claim to a term or utterance and using it against its “constitutive historicity” (Butler, 1993, p. 227). Yet, to Butler (1993), re-signification or the queering of language through performance is not simply a question of will or conviction. Rather, performance requires both the enactment of the utterance and the transference of binding power onto that utterance. The authority of the act is not determined by an external judge or the intent and convictions of the speaker; instead, it is located in the citational history of the discourse (Butler, 1993).

### 2NC---Link

#### They clearly use the metaphor:

“shareholder whiteness”—a concept that complements Bhandar’s discussion of the legal reification of race embedded in the Indian Act. Karuka homes in on the fictions of whiteness whose operations mirror fictitious capital

Whiteness, as a form of property, can be understood as the capacity to be an owner

#### Both of these decide to define interpersonal racial relations using the same analytical tools and discourse we use to describe turns

#### It’s not just the word “anti-competitive”, the way it was used promoted market logic and reflects the neoliberal desire a deregulated free marketplace of ideas

Thomas W. Joo 14, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law, “The Worst Test of Truth: The "Marketplace of Ideas" as Faulty Metaphor,” Tulane Law Review, 89, 383, December 2014, lexis.

III. Critique of the Metaphor

A. Market Competition as the "Best Test of Truth"

1. Normative "Truth"

The marketplace metaphor is most often invoked to support the notion that competitive discourse identifies normative "truth." But that view, no less than the Alvarez view, is unsupported by market theory. A market is a mechanism that reflects, in terms of prices, aggregated individual preferences. 172Link to the text of the note Success in the market means commanding favorable prices by satisfying the preferences of market participants. 173Link to the text of the note Markets are said "to deliver the best goods most efficiently [but] "best' is here defined solely ex post facto as that product which does so triumph or prevail in the marketplace." 174Link to the text of the note That is, product markets supply the kinds of items consumers prefer, at the prices consumers prefer to pay. These products may or may not be normatively good, as the popularity of tobacco, unhealthy foods, and polluting technologies attest. Similarly, capital markets provide the kinds of investments that investors prefer. The normative value of such investments does not necessarily follow: they may cater to irrational investor preferences, support socially undesirable enterprises, or contribute to systemic financial volatility (as the subprime mortgage debacle demonstrated).

Indeed, orthodox market theory is entirely agnostic with respect to normative "truth." It makes no claims about whether preferences are good in any objective sense. As one critique of the marketplace metaphor put it, "If consumers do not value truth very much (relatively speaking), perfect competition will efficiently ensure that they don't get very much truth as compared with other goods [such as entertainment, for example]." 175Link to the text of the note Free market theory may assume that it is good for people to formulate and act on their own preferences, but that is not the same as maintaining that those preferences are good ones; indeed, it is based on a refusal to judge individual preferences.

[\*409] The association of competitive success with normative superiority does not follow from the economic theory of markets. It is, however, consistent with noxious social notions, such as eugenics, that were popular around the time of Abrams. 176Link to the text of the note As noted above, Justice Holmes himself infamously advocated eugenics in his opinion for the Court in Buck v. Bell, upholding a law authorizing the forced sterilization of "mental defectives." 177Link to the text of the note Justice Holmes believed that the offspring of such "defectives" would be inferior members of society, and thus did not deserve to be born. "It is better for all the world," he wrote, "if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." 178Link to the text of the note Similarly, the evolutionary concept of "survival of the fittest" is often misinterpreted as a value judgment. 179Link to the text of the note But Charles Darwin himself drew a distinction between the competitively advantageous and the normatively good. 180Link to the text of the note Unlike Justice Holmes in Buck, Darwin insisted that the impulse to protect the weak is "the noblest part of our nature" and its moral value outweighs any "bad effects of the weak surviving and propagating their kind." 181Link to the text of the note

2. Empirical Truth

As argued above, the Court's insistence in Alvarez that markets identify empirical truth is a misreading of prior "marketplace of ideas" jurisprudence, which deals with normative choices, not empirical facts. It is also inconsistent with the way markets behave in both theory and practice. Economic markets do not operate to identify empirical truth any more than they identify normative "truth." Markets involve the buying and selling of products, services, securities, and the like. Such things (with few exceptions, such as nonfiction books) are neither true [\*410] nor false in the empirical sense. Rather, as noted above, they are merely preferred or not preferred.

Nor do markets reliably screen out false information about the products in the market. Such a belief depends on the dubious assumption that individuals are wise and rational enough to tell the difference between accurate and inaccurate information. 182Link to the text of the note Cognitive psychology research has demonstrated our inability to distinguish empirical truth from fiction. 183Link to the text of the note Markets have created countless asset bubbles based on misperceptions, from the South Sea bubble to tulip mania to the more recent dot-com and subprime bubbles. 184Link to the text of the note

#### It’s a value-laden statement disguised as an analogy that cloaks the spread of neoliberal ideology

Thomas W. Joo 14, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law, “The Worst Test of Truth: The "Marketplace of Ideas" as Faulty Metaphor,” Tulane Law Review, 89, 383, December 2014, lexis.

IV. Conclusion

As every grade-school English student learns, a metaphor is a figure of speech stating that one thing "is" another. Metaphors can work considerable mischief when that equation is taken literally. First Amendment jurisprudence takes literally the metaphorical statement that speech "is" a market. That is, rather than merely drawing figurative parallels between public discourse and economic markets, it collapses them into a single concept called "markets." 319Link to the text of the note This literalization of the legal metaphor has been helped along by economic analyses of law and policy, which have insisted that nearly all forms of social activity are literally economic markets. 320Link to the text of the note

At the same time that the scope of "market" has been expanding, the scope of "speech" protected under the First Amendment has been expanding as well. Justice Holmes and Justice Brennan cleverly deployed market rhetoric when it fit the zeitgeist of the Lochner and Cold War eras. More recently, it has been argued, corporations and business interests have turned the tables and displayed similar rhetorical "opportunism" by reframing their economic rights arguments in the more appealing language of the First Amendment. 321Link to the text of the note A long line of campaign finance cases, culminating most recently in Citizens United, has treated spending in support of candidates as speech, regardless of the identity of the spender. Commercial speech, once considered outside the First Amendment, enjoys considerable [\*432] constitutional protection. The First Amendment also protects nonverbal conduct; it "does not end at the spoken or written word." 322Link to the text of the note

If everything is a market, and everything is speech, then everything is both market and speech, and the two categories are literally coterminous - but so broad as to be meaningless. If everything is a market, and markets should not be regulated, then nothing - neither speech nor anything else - should be regulated. As markets and speech (and everything else) collapse into a single notion, the "marketplace of ideas" rhetoric is no longer specifically about any of the values involved in free speech theory, such as expressive rights, listeners' interests, preventing government suppression of dissent, or the search for "truth" (whether normative or empirical). Nor is it about any of the important functions of markets, such as efficient allocation of resources or setting prices to reflect demand. It is simply antiregulatory. Skepticism of government is of course consistent with a long and fundamental libertarian tradition in Anglo-American thought. But the metaphor is more than skeptical. Because it lacks insights into how to limit regulation, it reduces to free-market and free-speech absolutism.

Furthermore, the marketplace of ideas metaphor advances an argument that fails on its own terms. It purports to be an instrumental theory based on the observed characteristics of markets - that is, it argues that speech deregulation will produce a good (i.e., "truth") in the way that unregulated markets allegedly do. But market processes do not produce truth, and the law polices markets vigorously for this very reason. There are of course many reasons to be skeptical of government regulation of both speech and of markets, but those reasons are specific to the distinct institutions of speech and those of economic markets. By claiming to identify "truth" as a shared reason for deregulating speech and markets, the marketplace metaphor ignores the actual, valuable functions of both speech and markets.

The marketplace rhetoric also illuminates the use of metaphor in legal argument and elsewhere. As this Article has argued, metaphors are often normative assertions disguised as reasoned analogical arguments. While a metaphor purports to use our knowledge about one phenomenon (such as "markets") to provide insights into a second phenomenon (such as "speech"), it is actually making arguments about [\*433] both the first and second phenomena. 323Link to the text of the note That is, the marketplace metaphor not only advances the assertion that speech should be unregulated like markets, but also tacitly advances the unexamined assertion that markets themselves should be unregulated.

### 2NC---Link---AT: Repurposing

#### Repurposing doesn’t solve---it shapes subjectivities of speaker and listener irrespective of intent

Lakoff, UC Berkeley linguistics professor, co-founder and Senior Fellow of the Rockridge Institute, 1999

(George, “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy,” December, http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/products/metaphoricalthought.pdf)

#### Cognitive linguistics is the field that studies this crucial part of what GII needs. It is a systematic, scientific approach within the cognitive sciences to the study of how we understand. How we act in a situation depends on how we understand it. Our mechanisms of understanding are mostly unconscious; we have no direct conscious access to how we understand. Cognitive science, the interdisciplinary study of the mind, has made some deep and important discoveries about the mechanisms of understanding. One is that we have systems of conceptual structures (called "frames" and "scripts") that we use to understand situations in the world. Another is that our understanding is, to a large extent, not straightforward or ”literal,” but rather makes use of a system of conceptual metaphors — ways to understand concepts in terms of other concepts, as when we understand affection in terms of warmth or purposes in terms of reaching destinations. Another important finding is that language is directly connected to such unconscious conceptual systems and metaphors. How we talk matters; one can learn a lot about how people frame situations from how they talk. Conversely, having effective language to express ideas is extremely powerful. Merely hearing the language again and again plants in the mind a mode of understanding. And if you can affect how others understand situations, you can affect what they do in those situations. In short, there is a link from language to conceptual framing to action. And in many cases, the link is from metaphorical language to metaphorical framing to action.

## Case

### 2NC---AT: Solvency

#### Mutual aid fails to escape or mitigate violence---gets trapped in the university

Webb 18—Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield (Darren, “Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 40:2, 96-118, dml)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more. The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street. The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that. Identifying the academy as the starting point for a utopian pedagogy privileges this arcane space over sites of public pedagogy such as film, television, literature, sport, advertising, architecture, media in its various forms, political organizations, religious institutions, and the workplace (Todd 1997). Perhaps the emphasis on creating radical experimental spaces within the academy needs to shift toward operating in existing spaces of resistance outside it. Haiven and Khasnabish argue that many social movements function already as “social laboratories for the generation of alternative relationships, subjectivities, institutions and practices” (2014, 62), providing “a space for experiments in knowledge production, radical imagination, subjectification, and concrete alternative-building” (Khasnabish 2012, 237). Why locate utopian pedagogy in the university when “critical utopian politics” can take place in “infrastructures of resistance” such as intentional communities, housing collectives, squats, art centers, community theatres, bars, book shops, health collectives, social centers, independent media and, increasingly of course, the digital sphere (Firth 2012; Shantz 2012; Amsler 2015; Dallyn, Marinetto, and Cederstrom 2015)? Moving beyond short-term, localized, temporary modes of resistance, utopian pedagogy would work across these sites to develop a long-term strategy and vision. There is a role for the academic in utopian politics, but not in the university-as-such. The utopian pedagogue has a responsibility to exploit their own privilege and to work with students, communities and movements outside and divorced from the university. As Shear rightly notes, academics (and especially those working in the humanities and social sciences) “inhabit a privileged space in which critical inquiry concerning social hegemony and political-economic domination” is possible (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, however, spaces for embodying and enacting this kind of inquiry have become constrained, compromised, monitored, surveilled, co-opted, and recuperated. As I have argued throughout this article, utopian pedagogy has become a search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. Beyond the academy, however, there is a role to play. As Chomsky (2010) tells us, with privilege comes responsibility. And as Giroux frames it, this is an ethical and political responsibility to provide “theoretical resources and modes of analysis” to help forge “a utopian imaginary” (Giroux 2014a; 153; 2014b, 200). This means putting one’s knowledge and resources to use in the service of a collaborative process of memory- and story-making, pulling together disparate inchoate dreams and yearnings in order to generate a utopian vision that can help inform, guide, and mobilize long-term collective action for systemic change.

#### Revolution doesn’t matter if it can’t improve day to day conditions

Day 9 (Christopher, The Historical Failure of Anarchism: Implications for the Future of the Revolutionary Project, ttp://mikeely.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/historical\_failure\_of\_aanarchism\_chris\_day\_kasama.pdf)

The strength of anarchism is its moral insistence on the primacy of human freedom over political expediency. But human freedom exists in a political context. It is not sufficient, however, to simply take the most uncompromising position in defense of freedom. It is neccesary to actually win freedom. Anti-capitalism doesn’t do the victims of capitalism any good if you don’t actually destroy capitalism. Anti-statism doesn’t do the victims of the state any good if you don’t actually smash the state. Anarchism has been very good at putting forth visions of a free society and that is for the good. But it is worthless if we don’t develop an actual strategy for realizing those visions. It is not enough to be right, we must also win. Continues… Finally, revolutionaries have a responsibility to have a plausible plan for making revolution. Obviously, there are not enough revolutionaries to make a revolution at this moment. We can reasonably anticipate that the future will bring upsurges in popular opposition to the existing system. Without being any more specific about where those upsurges might occur it seems clear that it is from the ranks of such upsurges that the numbers of the revolutionary movement will be increased, eventually leading to a revolutionary situation (which is distinguished from the normal crises of the current order only by the existence of a revolutionary movement ready to push things further). People who are fed up with the existing system and who are willing to commit themselves to its overthrow will look around for likeminded people who have an idea of what to do. If we don’t have a plausible plan for making revolution we can be sure that there will be somebody else there who will. There is no guarantee that revolutionary-minded people will be spontaneously drawn to anti-authoritarian politics. The plan doesn’t have to be an exact blueprint. It shouldn’t be treated as something sacred. It should be subject to constant revision in light of experience and debate. But at the very least it needs to be able to answer questions that have been posed concretely in the past. We know that we will never confront the exact same circumstances as previous revolutions. But we should also know that certain problems are persistent ones and that if we can’t say what we would have done in the past we should not expect people to think much of our ability to face the future

### 2NC---Turn---Coercive Mimeticism

#### Doubling forms the basis for the most excessive forms of violence

McLean 16 Aisha, Graduate Dissertation, University of Sheffield. “Power and Racialisation: Exploring the childhood and educational experiences of four mixed young people using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.” 2016.

Fanon: Psychoanalytic theories of Colonialism. Frantz Fanon was an anti-colonial thinker of the twentieth century, whose texts include ‘The Wretched of the Earth’ (Fanon, 2004) and ‘Black Skin, White Masks’ (Fanon, 1967). Fanon’s personal background as a Black man, and his professional background in psychoanalysis and phenomenology, led him to write about anti-colonialism from a psychological perspective. Fanon’s writing is particularly interested in the power of Whiteness, and the psychological systems which have developed as part of this process of maintenance, particularly within the Black psyche (Leonardo and Porter, 2010). The psychology of colonialism and Blackness are unpicked in direct relation to Whiteness. The inferiority that White structures of colonialism have created toward and within Blackness are embedded within Fanon’s work (Sardar, 2008). In Fanon’s work, colonialism is seen as an act of violence against Black people (Sardar, 2008). Leonardo and Porter (2010) argue for the relationship between colonialism and education as different sides of the same institutional structures, which continue to inflict acts of subjugation and violence against Black people. Modern education is thus seen as a means of maintaining White dominance and White ‘comfort’ (Leonardo and Porter, 2010), which keeps Whiteness ‘safe’ from difficult discussions about race and racism. Fanonian theory draws significantly on the theory of interpellation; embedded within issues of power and subjugation. Interpellation is discussed in the ‘definitions’ table in the introduction (pp. 1). In brief, interpellation refers to Althusser’s (1971) theory where individuals ‘recognise themselves as ‘hailed’ or placed in categories by ideology’ (Abdi, 2015 pp.60). In this instance, an interaction of dominance and subjugation is enacted through placing the interpellated into a category based on pre-set, racialised views of what the interpellated person ‘is’. Fanon (1967) also builds on ideas of ‘doubling’ or the ‘doubled self’ as introduced by DuBois (1994) in relation to interpellation. In doubling, individuals recognise themselves as positioned within a particular racialised category by others. The associated ‘ways of being’ within this racialised category are also recognised by the individual being positioned. In this dynamic, the individual who recognises themselves as perceived in such a way takes up the position, and behaves the way they feel the other expects them to (Fanon, 1967). This act of ‘doubling’ is seen by Fanon (1967, 1961) as an act of subjugation against the racialised group, both on an individual and on an ideological level. On an individual level, in recognising their positioning by others and responding to it as they expect the positioning to mean, the individual submits to a narrow view of themselves as defined only by their racialised categorisation (Fanon, 1967). This limits their view of themselves outside of this category, and disavows their identity on an individual level. On an ideological level, the individual submits to and recreates the ideological construction of their racialisation, thus maintaining the construction of their racialised self as a ‘truth’ of that racialised category (Fanon, 1967).

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## K---Bifo

### 2NC---T/C

#### Competition turns the aff:

#### 1---Their model makes a racist debate community a self-fulfilling prophecy

**Berlant and Helms 12** [Gesa Helms, Marina Vishmidt, Lauren Berlant, Professor of English at the University of Chicago, “Affect & the Politics of Austerity: An interview exchange with Lauren Berlant,” *Variant* 43, Spring 2012]

Can we bear to reinvent “new relational modes” across the incommensurate scenes of work-nature-intimate stranger, and not just among lovers? Can we bear to see the good of education neither as citizen-building toward monoculture (even “in difference”) nor as engineering vocational allegories of self-worth, but a space for the kinds of creativity and improvised interest that cultivate in people a curiosity about living (how it’s been and how it might be) that’s genuine and genuinely experimental and not, as you say, aspiring to an unbreachable rational space? If we are educated in experimentality and curiosity, alterity’s comic mode of recognition-in-bafflement, then we diminish our fear of the stranger and of the stranger in ourselves, the place where we don’t make any more sense than the world does, in all of our tenderness and aggression. We would refuse to do the speculative work of policing and foreclosing each other that lets the state and capital off the hook for exhausting workers and pressuring communities to clean up their act, not be inconvenient, and to be sorry they tried to live well. To make possible the time and space for flourishing affective infrastructures, of grace and graciousness, such as those I’ve described could make happiness and social optimism possible not as prophylactic fantasy or credit psychosis but in ordinary existence. All of the hustling that goes on amongst the working and non-working poor and the generally stressed has to do with the desire to coast a little instead of work and police ourselves to death. But right now there’s not a lot of easy coasting going around outside of the zones of disinhibition that provide episodes of relief from the daily exhaustion, and people seem to think that if they’re policed, if they’re always auditioning for citizenship and social membership, so too should others be forced to live near the edge of the cliff and earn standing, the right to stand. Welfare used to be called ‘relief’. ‘Relief’ must have said much more than it was bearable to say about the capitalist stress position.

So then, you ask, how can we reroute shame for making a better social world. Is turning a “shame on you” back on the state effective for organizing not only social justice but an image of a better state, better labor relations, better sociality amongst strangers whose class and collective interest is really not the same, really not ambitious to produce the same better good life? Partly I’m a pragmatist: whatever works to interfere with the reproduction of mass injustice, in this case, the projection of the burden for revamping the cushion and the net onto the people who need the cushion and the net, while the wealthy hoard more of that for themselves. But I still think the battle to be thought through and won is at the level of the imaginary: to confront how powerfully exceptional the neoliberal and democratic economic bubbles of the last 60 years are, how expensive individualism is, how the idea of a mortgaged future needs to be confronted in its stark realities, how entirely different models of collective dependence need to be forged in relation to the reproduction of life because there is no money and the poverty is both material and imaginary. I don’t think it’s about converting shame, therefore, into pride or anything. I think it requires a hard confrontation with and a very difficult process of changing what the reproduction of life means in both pragmatic and phantasmatic terms. What this means will vary, but its impact on the political and on the social relations of labour will be astonishing, because it has to happen: there will be politics, and there will be sacrifice, and there will be a chaos of wants responded to badly and with a bigger burden on the already vulnerable unless they converge to rethink their own investments in inequality and xenophobia, the ready-to-hand fear formations. In Slow Death6 I argue that the long process of delegating worse life and earlier death to the poor and hyper-exploited is now becoming general through the population, such that mental health and physical health are at war (as seen in the amount of alcoholism and obesity rampant wherever a commodity culture reigns as the collective scene for forging pleasure in a now beyond which there is no future) and that mental health is winning (if what we mean is affective, appetitive relief from exhausted sovereignty). Can people bear to fight themselves for better versions of the good life for everyone? Or are we now spiralling down the rabbit hole of liberal culture, where people will only dig in and fight for the right to their individual pleasure?

#### 2---Mutual aid is impossible within the paradigm of competition.

Laurence Simard-Gagnon 16, Department of Geography, Queen’s University, “Everyone is fed, bathed, asleep, and I have made it through another day: Problematizing accommodation, resilience, and care in the neoliberal academy,” April 2016, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cag.12274

Following the principle of competition, if some are to succeed it is necessary that some fail. Neoliberalism entails letting die, smothering even, the casualties of marketization. It entails individualization of life circumstances, including needs and, importantly, struggles and failures that occur when needs come in the way of an individual’s capacity to compete. Neoliberalism entails exhaustion. As I am making the final revisions on this paper, I have been experiencing partial deafness for over a year, related to an untreated inner ear infection which will now result in permanent hearing loss. I did not attend to it sooner—it was not urgent, and time and energy are so scarce. They have been made even more so this year as my son has not been attending school full-time: some weeks he won’t go for more than two or three half days. The recent neoliberal cuts to public services in the province of Québec—where I reside—have translated into losses here and there, from removal of school transportation services to cuts in hours of specialized education, effectively reducing the amount of time an autistic child can spend at school. It is now late at night, and I write these lines on an old and very slow netbook as my computer broke down: when I bought it I had very limited financial resources, so I got a cheap model with no guarantee. I could have had it fixed sooner, instead I was striving to pass my PhD comprehensive examination these last months. There is nothing extraordinary in these circumstances, no one trait that could be neatly identified and removed, no one issue that could be adjusted or fixed, so that I could at last perform as a competitive and unencumbered individual. The liberal normative prescription of atomic independence, combined with the neoliberal imperative of competition, have ~~debilitating~~ [massive] implications for mental health, particularly for those who are, like me, struggling to meet their needs and those of the ones they care for. Their overlapping actions individualize and decontextualize not only our needs and the circumstances in which needs arise, but also our personal failures to meet both these needs and the demands of individuated functionality. Academia, care, and resilience One of the ways in which liberal and neoliberal versions of independence and needs are most debilitating is through the idea of resilience. Resilience is often used as a term to celebrate the ongoing efforts of those who continue to perform despite difficulties and struggles related to their particular circumstances (see Jackson et al. 2007). When thinking in terms of care, the idea of resilience is problematic because, as Cindy Katz points out, social reproduction, almost by definition, must be accomplished (Katz 2001). No matter how difficult our circumstances or how bare our resources get, we, and the persons we care for, need to eat, sleep, be clothed, warmed, and loved, at least at a minimal level, in order to go on. Thus people will go to great lengths (of resilience) to perform care. Resilience, therefore, cannot be taken as an indicator that people are thriving despite the obstacles they encounter, despite the inhumane and unjust expectations they face, particularly in this moment of increasingly harsh neoliberalism (Diprose 2015). Resilience is in fact incredibly stressful. Beyond the financial and logistical stress associated with both pursuing an academic path and caring for others, being resilient implies sustaining the ever underlying stress of feeling that one is never adequately filling their own needs and those of their dependents. In this context, resilience implies a projection into the future perfect (see Povinelli 2011 for a discussion on tenses in late liberal capitalist economies). It is the idea that there will be a future moment when the unsustainability of (poor) caring practices will abate. “When this article is written, this presentation done, this chapter completed—these hardships that I am inflicting on myself and the ones I care for will be over, and it will all have been worth it.” Except that this moment never comes. Within an increasingly competitive academic context, demands are ever emerging and there is no final moment of grace. As I am writing these lines, everyone in my house is finally fed, bathed, asleep, and I have made it through another day. It is an exhausting victory, yet nothing has been achieved that will not have to be recommenced tomorrow. I have made it through another day, yet the days of ‘another day’ are endless. As problematic as it is, however, there are not many alternatives to being resilient, to reconcile as well as we can the ever emerging needs of existence and caring with the expectations for independent and competitive accomplishments, while waiting for an ever elusive future perfect. Resilience is indeed fuelled by the fear of breaking down, or, of falling behind. Centering our vision of productive contributions as engagements of atomic and individuated individuals fosters a logic of “if you can’t take the heat, you had better get out of the kitchen.” In that context, asking for help is complicated or hindered by the apprehension that responses, even from compassionate and concerned peers and superiors, will be grounded in that logic: “It might be better for you to stop or take a break at this point,” or “Maybe later when your circumstances are better…”. This, however, is not going to happen; these circumstances will not get better, because once again they are not a punctual and discrete appendage of a self—or a cohort—that can be circumscribed or cut out. They are embedded in one’s very subjectivity, relationships, and existence. Meanwhile the ways we care for one another within the context of academia are grounded in the dominant logic of independence and resilience. Our paths as academics are tightly woven in an institution fuelled by individualism and its correlate ideal of independence, and the ways in which we care for one another most often fail to radically challenge this, and to acknowledge the infinity and relationality of our needs. Caring others—people who care about struggling individuals, about inequalities in general—will attempt to facilitate academic paths, but often their actions are limited to more or less punctual accommodations, such as being a sympathetic listener, providing tissues in which to cry, and granting extensions. This entails, for the person receiving this type of support, the stress of navigating academic life through often last minute actions of generosity that are entirely dependent on the good will of others, and of knowing that this path of navigation is unsustainable. In my case it also entails a dissonant feeling of gratitude for this generosity and trust—it somehow entails being in the position where I am genuinely grateful for being allowed to continue maintaining my own existence and that of those who depend on me. Punctual acts of generosity and trust are also costly for those who bestow them. Unsurprisingly in a liberal institution, and particularly in these neoliberal times, the burden of it rests on individuals. In addition to the logistical complications that supporting struggling individuals can entail, there is also the anxiety and dangers of venturing out of the current academic logic of individualism and competition. Watching struggling individuals struggle, and attempting to care for them, generates strain—I have seen it in the faces of compassionate peers and professors, I have felt it in my face when confronted by the needs of struggling peers. There again, future perfect is often our false and cold comfort: “I know it’s hard, but just get this thing done, give a good hard push this time around, and then it’ll be done”. Caring, however, is necessary as a way to escape the debilitating effects of liberal and neoliberal paradigms of individualism and competition in the academy. On every university campus there are officially designated places of care. Although necessary, these services tend to respond to punctual and neatly delineated needs—such as discrete episodes of illness or mental distress. But the type of caring that truly facilitates my existence is one that does not seek out the independent and functional person within the grounded, slow, and encumbered mess that I am. Places of care are indeed those places that resist this sort of surgical violence. In my institution one such place is found at a centre offering services for students who are older women and/or women with children. There, one can find a free meal, a bed to rest on, companionship, or silence. The centre is open everyday, to anyone, as the needs it addresses are understood to be universal, rather than punctual traits or shortcomings of a subjectivity that is dysfunctional in one (or a few) specific ways. Where needs are not failures, one does not have to identify as such. And so every moment spent in this place of care preserves for a little while longer the possibilities of my sustained presence in the academia—the possibilities of an alternative social project (see Povinelli 2011). Although it may seem unsatisfactory and insufficient, maintaining possibilities in the face of exhaustion is critical—it is the basis of everything, including change (Katz 2001; Povinelli 2011). The type of caring that sustains my continued existence as an academic implies inserting a logic of relationality, responsibility, and inter-dependency within a structure grounded on individualism and independence—it implies inserting a transgressive current within an institution which doesn’t have the eyes to recognize it. Caring, then, is very much like Certeau’s perruque (Certeau 1991): a wig made from scrap material by a factory worker, who opportunistically appropriates glimpses of company resources to create something unseen and unforeseen by the power in place—to serve a subversive purpose. Like making a wig, caring within the academy is a creative diversion—of time, of attention, of affection, of academic positions designed to foster individual achievements and competition. It is a wink of recognition to other meanings within a totalizing space. It is an act of resistance.

#### 3---Increased visibilty within debate only serves to deradicalize their theory and entrench it’s dependency on white recognition and evaluation

Curry 13 (Tommy, Texas A&M Philosophy Prof, “Dr. Tommy Curry on the importance of debate for blacks”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMmkPhvDK2E#t=174> (transcribed), Oct 3)

However, with the lure of progress, more black people are participating in debate, more black judges, more conceptual debates about blackness. There comes a deradicalization of what black theory and what black people are supposed to do and represent. Despite our pretense, debate is still a very privileged world. It’s a pretend world where black people can have their queerness, their feebleness, their faux radicality recognized. For actual oppressed people, people who can’t afford debate, who have no knowledge of debate, who fight against actual mechanisms of state, who are not recognized, these very same qualities mean death. So in debate rounds we get to act, we’re the conduits of this black suffering. The demographic increase in the black population in debate, however, it’s kind of brought about a new morality that’s committed to fighting for inclusion, intellectual space, our expanded ideas of home. But in this I think we miss the extent of our dependency on white recognition. That white judge in the back of the room that’s comprehending and assimilating our goals with their own liberal and progressive existence. In other words, it’s through our appeal to white men and women, our need for their recognition, for their ballot, that frames the ultimate message of our pessimism, our gender critiques, our colonial analysis. We’re fundamentally dependent on how the white mind situates itself conceptually to the project of diversification. We appeal to their sympathy, or worse yet, to the intersectional empathies of whites as the gauge of the transformative potentialities of black theory and historic black thought. So in these spaces real radicality does not come from an appeal to white recognition, but the rejection of it. In the declaration that black knowledge or black theory or black accounts of existence in all of the economic and sexual plurality of our thought is the radicality comes from the idea that we think that those questions can be answered in the annals of how black people have historically thought about themselves. It need not depend on our alliances or allegiances with white liberals rationalizing their own existence as justifiable through their endorsement or alliances with what we think about ourselves or black people’s situation in the world. Black debate should ultimately move to the rejection of white education – adjudication if black theory is about the liberation of black people and a move to definitions of knowledge or cells or concepts that don’t currently exist then how can we expect the dilapidated ideas of white sentimentality projected from an archaic and racialized whiteness to understand or even comprehend the interrelatedness of propositions that are beyond their present being. How they understand something that is beyond their very own existence the true radicality of black people debating points to the negation of white comprehension of black ideas of liberation not their assimilation or recognition of them. So these ideas of us saying we have progressed fundamentally rooted in how white people see us is a problem.

#### 4---Debate is counterproductive for knowledge production and convincing people

Livingston 12 (Alexander, Assistant Prof of Gov’t @ Cornell. postdoctoral fellow in the department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, and a doctoral fellow at the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto, Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and the Public Sphere, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2012), pp. 269-294, Project MUSE

Deliberative democracy is a fantasy, and a dangerous one at that. A politics of pure deliberation is the dream of hare-brained philosophy professors who, fetishizing consensus, would reduce all political conflict to moral disagreement, purge passion from politics, and substitute the disinterested and boring experience of jury duty for the vital and indispensable experience of action, and all this just for the sake of theoretical parsimony. At its best deliberative democracy’s moralization and rationalization of politics stinks of a bad nostalgia for a classical participatory democracy that never existed. At its worst, it is a license for an exclusionary politics of elite decision making that silences the voices of the needy and degenerates into a variant of technocratic management from above. [End Page 269]

Or so much of the rhetoric of its critics goes.1 That this caricature of deliberative democracy is familiar ought to be the occasion for some worry. A general skepticism concerning the claims of public reason has seeped into much of the landscape of contemporary political theory, making this kind of easy rejection of deliberation both comprehensible and all too plausible. Yet this kind of rejection is too fast and depends on a straw man account of what deliberative democracy means. The aim of this article is to make the case that this caricature is wrong and that such skepticism about public reason is unwarranted. Deliberative democracy is a robust theory of the political that, at its best, lays the groundwork for an egalitarian and even radical democratic politics. To this end, I propose to read the recent work of William E. Connolly as an expression of political theory’s skeptical critique of public reason. Connolly is exemplary of this wider skepticism in that while he offers a powerful critique of deliberative democracy, his critical alternative is only plausible when rearticulated as a variant of deliberative democracy itself.

Connolly argues that contemporary findings in neuroscience and cognitive science, mixed with a healthy dose of Gilles Deleuze’s cosmological pluralism, reveal a deep, visceral register of human thinking that theories of deliberative democracy overlook at their own peril. Deliberative democracy’s rationalism turns a blind eye to this political unconscious and relegates the theory to an ineffectual “intellectualism,” but, according to Connolly, the left today needs to make this unconscious lower register its fighting grounds if it hopes to hold its ground against an insurgent neoconservative “micropolitics” of media manipulation. This is a suggestive line of argument, but ought it lead to a rejection of deliberative democracy or instead to a more robust and complex account of communicative agency in our media-saturated world?

Connolly travels the first route, but I argue that his alternative to deliberation that he dubs “micropolitics,” a politics of the ordinary that politicizes habits, dispositions, feelings, the body, emotions, and thinking as potential sites of domination and resistance below the register of formal principles and procedures, can only be defended by following the second route. Given the way that Connolly presents the problem of the visceral register there does not seem to be much role for deliberation in his vision of democratic politics. While he often stresses that “intellectualism is constitutively insufficient to ethics,” he strains to remind us that saying this is not the same as saying that deliberation has no role to play (2002, 111). Issuing a series of caveats, Connolly notes that “nothing in the [End Page 270] above carries the implication of eliminating argument, rationality, language, or conscious thought from public discourse” and that he only means “to flag the insufficiency of argument to ethical life without denying its pertinence” (1999, 36; 2002, 108). The goal of his turn to micropolitics is not to replace deliberation but rather to “augment intellectualist models of thinking and culture” (2002, 13). Given the role of affective modes of appraisal in politics, I agree with Connolly that theories of public reason ought to be amended and “augmented” in many ways. Yet, for all his caveats, Connolly’s vision of micropolitical engagement seems to give short shrift to practices of public deliberation. Indeed, his theory only announces their compatibility but does not follow through in enacting it. In what follows, I try to close this circle, so to speak, by demonstrating the deliberative potential of Connolly’s agonistic pluralism.2 I agree that a politics of the visceral reveals the shortcomings of theories of deliberative democracy that prioritize small community meetings and experimental “mini-publics” as the sine qua non of democratic citizenship today, but Connolly overlooks the resources provided by an alternative account of deliberative democracy; namely, a critical and sociologically complex theory of deliberative democracy that aims at revising our self-understandings and provoking self-transformation.

Intellectualism and the Visceral Register

The first step in exploring the potential of William Connolly’s reluctant theory of deliberative democracy is to come to terms with the reasons why he thinks extant accounts of communicative politics are insufficient. Intellectualism, Connolly argues, is the grand failing of deliberative democracy. In accusing deliberative democracy of intellectualism, he is not issuing a by-now familiar criticism of deliberative rationalism. To say that deliberative democracy is guilty of intellectualism is not to say that it is blind to questions of power, or identity, or difference—or at least it’s not only to say this—but rather that deliberative models of democracy are working with a faulty conception of thinking. They have been captured by what Gilles Deleuze calls “the image of thought”—the idea that thinking is an autonomous, linguistically mediated process of mind that is oriented toward coherence and truth (1994, 129–67). Deliberative thinking takes place at one relatively transparent register where our reasons for action can be compared, reasoned about, and revised through the force of the better argument. This image of thought is intellectualist because it fails to see how thought is a layered process of neural, perceptual, and embodied activity not reducible to conceptual ratiocination alone. “Attempts to give priority to the highest and conceptually most sophisticated brain nodules in thinking and judgment,” Connolly argues, “may encourage those invested in these theories to underestimate the importance of body image, unconscious motor memory, and thought-imbued affect” (2002, 10).

Against the intellectualist image of thought, Connolly argues that thinking is distributed across multiple registers that make possible “visceral modes of appraisal” (1999, 27). It is these deep, intensive, and reactive visceral modes of thinking and judgment that the deliberative image of thinking overlooks. Disgust, for example, is a visceral response that makes your stomach turn. It seems to well up inside you without your willing it. The values and beliefs of others can sometimes stimulate this kind of feeling, say, if they present you with a defense of cloning, or euthanasia, or gay marriage, as the case may be. You can’t always put your finger on what it is that strikes you as so disgusting and morally contaminating about such proposals, but sometimes you just feel that they are plain wrong. We’re unable to provide defensible reasons for our responses. Sometimes things just rub us the wrong way.

Connolly’s point is that visceral and embodied responses like disgust, shame, and hatred come to play a role in political decision making—as they evidently do in political deliberations about matters such as cloning, euthanasia, and gay marriage—and that a deliberative approach is poorly equipped to deal with them. Deliberative democrats either require that these sorts of affective feelings are purged from the public sphere as unfortunate distortions of real communication, or they suggest that they can be subject to deliberation and argument just as any other sort of belief, interest, or prejudice can be. Connolly thinks that both of these approaches are bound to fail. Visceral reactions are not conceptually sophisticated thoughts and as such are not amenable to deliberation, argumentation, or verbal persuasion. The exchange of validity claims alone is not enough to stop your stomach from churning when you think about the right to die. Deliberative democrats need to learn “how much more there is to thinking than argument” and to begin experimenting with alternative forms of political engagement (1999, 149). Because political judgment is so often carried out at the level of this visceral or virtual register, deliberation cannot provide a privileged or efficacious form of participation, justification, or transformation.

To corroborate these claims about the multiple registers of thinking, Connolly turns to recent findings in neuroscience that suggest a more intimate relationship between reason, the emotions, and the body than [End Page 272] the intellectualist account assumes. Like some other political theorists, Connolly hopes that a closer engagement with neurology and cognitive science will provide grounds for a more adequate account of subjectivity, reason, and ethics.3 The kind of thinking that intellectualists privilege—sophisticated, conceptual, reflective, deliberative, and linguistically mediated thought—pertains to the activity of the largest part of the brain, the cerebral cortex. It is through the rich and complex layers of neural activity in the cortex that we can perform intricate activities like planning, speaking, reasoning, and arguing. What recent findings in neuroscience suggest, however, is that cortical activity is not autonomous and is in fact in some ways subservient to the parts of the brain that control emotions, memory, and affect.4

In particular, the cortex responds to information from the limbic system, the small curved part of the brain below the cortex that controls emotion and fine motor movement. Made up of the basal ganglia, the hippo-campus, and the amygdala, the limbic system enables the fast, intensive, and reactive action of affects. The jolt of fear that makes one’s hair stand on end or the disgust that we feel in the pit of our stomachs is the work of the part of the limbic system called the amygdala. The sort of reactions governed by this system are an evolutionary necessity for a species that needs to appraise and respond to dangerous situations quickly and effectively without much cognitive expenditure. The decision to jump out of the way of a speeding car needs to happen in a split second. It is not the sort of situation that allows you to deliberate about the relative merits of your different options before acting. But this is not to say that the limbic system is entirely thoughtless. It is not concerned with sophisticated, conceptual, and deliberative thinking, but its actions certainly are symbolically mediated or “thought imbued” in some sense (the expression is Connolly’s). These intense affective responses are not entirely biologically determined but instead take a fair deal of cultural learning. The limbic system in a sense learns or records cultural standards of what is dangerous and what is disgusting and then habituates them as automated response.5

Between the cortex and limbic system there is a “feedback loop” of mutual influence through which these fast, affective, “proto-thoughts” of the limbic system shape the slow, reflective thinking of the cortex (2002). The existence of these intensive, instinctive elements moving below the register of reflective judgment means that human reason is not pure and autonomous but rather is shaped in a complex way at the neural level by the influence of the emotions and affects.6 David Hume, it would seem, [End Page 273] was right to say that reason is in fact the slave of the passions. And what this means for politics is that the emotions and affects that shape and guide thinking are themselves deeply influenced by values and opinions that we may or may not actually want to endorse. Racist, sexist, homophobic, and other ideological sentiments may lodge themselves deeply into this “body-brain-culture network” (2002). Where this is the case, valid and sound argumentation is at a loss to dislodge them and the force of the better argument may be powerless to persuade us to respect, tolerate, or trust each other in the ways that democratic cooperation require. Connolly explains: Culturally preorganized charges shape perception and judgment in ways that exceed the picture of the world supported by the models of calculative reason, intersubjective culture, and deliberative democracy. They show us how linguistically complex brain regions respond not only to events in the world but also, proprioceptively, to cultural habits, skills, memory traces, and affects mixed into our muscles, skin, gut, and cruder brain regions. (2002, 36) This all culminates in a critique of deliberative models of democracy: the inability of practical reason to influence these potentially dangerous or hateful “culturally preorganized charges” points to its undoing. Visceral Politics

Before analyzing the merits of Connolly’s critique of deliberative democracy I want to first situate his charge of intellectualism within its political context. At its heart, Connolly’s objection to the deliberative turn in democratic theory boil down to his belief that too much focus on the terms of justification and legitimation ignores the everyday sensibilities expressed and reproduced in the actions of citizens. These sensibilities are not identical to doctrinal beliefs or articulate reasons; or, as he prefers to put it in his most recent book, spirituality is not identical with doctrinal creed (2008). Rather, the sensibility that determines how it is that we hold our beliefs or “creed” is unreflectively informs this visceral register of judgment and thinking. Where these sensibilities have been cultivated to promote respect, responsiveness, and generosity a pluralistic liberalism can thrive. The political problem, however, is that in contemporary America this noble ethos is largely absent. Instead Connolly argues that this visceral register has become a vehicle for a “stingy” sensibility animated by resentment, fear, and a desire for revenge (1999, 7). The deep roots of existential resentment in an increasingly disempowered American working class today provide the spiritual common ground for the an emerging coalition of competing neoconservative and neoliberal elites who share a punitive and vengeful ethic while disagreeing on matters of doctrine. The resulting theological-corporate-media apparatus Connolly calls “the evangelical-capitalist resonance machine” wreaks havoc on American democracy today as it proceeds to undermine the terms of liberal pluralism and roll back the hard-won achievements of the liberal democratic struggles of the last hundred years (2008, 39–68). Democratic theory’s idea of deliberation seems poorly equipped to confront this threat.

Connolly’s contention is that the failing of the left in America today is due in no small part to its resistance to accepting the role of the visceral register in politics. Instead, it is still caught up in a potentially antiquated search for some better argument that would bring reason and truth together to serve the ends of justice. The American right, however, has been a much better student of the visceral elements of thinking and has crafted an array of strategies that seek to manipulate it to punitive ends. Among working-class Americans who have suffered unemployment with the collapse of the industrial economy, cultural alienation from a powerfully secular and liberal cultural elite, and social fragmentation from the increasing speed, ethnic pluralism, and diversity of a globalizing world, there exists a reserve of resentment to be tapped. Neoliberals and neoconservatives on the American right have overcome their traditional antagonism to draw on this resentment and channel it into a shared spirituality of revenge that vilifies foreigners, immigrants, nonwhites, women, queers, liberals, and secularists.7 Crucial to the success of this resonance machine has been its most powerful echo chamber: the media. Savvy exploitation of new media technologies enable conditions of mass persuasion through which the sentiments of resentment are validated, entering “the thought-imbued feelings of viewers before being subjected to critical scrutiny” (2008, 55), and channeled to political ends. Twenty-four-hour news shows, aggressive and partisan pundits, and the constant fluctuation of terror alerts all combine to excite, code, and steer visceral fear and anxiety. The result is the proliferation of “ugly dispositions” that the powerful media machinery of the right “can foment and amplify, installing them in habitual patterns of perception, identity, interest, and judgments of entitlement” (2008, 53).